THE

MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

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SIGNS OF THE TIMES

Prayers for Rain.

The Archbishop of Canterbury has recently issued the following statement in reply to a request that he would appoint a day of intercession for rain and authorize special forms of prayer for that purpose :

> 'The long drought is still causing widespread anxiety. It is a natural and right instinct of religion that, in such times of anxiety, men should lay their needs before God—an instinct vindicated by Him who taught men to ask their Father, who is in heaven, to give them their daily bread.
>
> 'Such prayers ought to be spontaneous and continuous. I do not, therefore, think it advisable to appoint any Special Day of Prayer. Nor is there need to issue any special forms of prayer. For private and public use there are the Prayer for Rain in the Book of Common Prayer, and the Prayer for Seasonable Weather in the revised Book of 1928; and the people may be asked to use the Lord's Prayer with the special attention of our present need. In such ways as these, and in humble reliance on His care, let us make our requests known unto God.'

Not a few sober-minded and loyal members of the Church of England will feel gratified at the Primate's reply. In many congregations to-day there are a number of people who regard prayers for rain with disapproval. Charles Kingsley was one of the first of our English clergy publicly to object to prayers of this kind. Science, it is held, teaches that Nature operates by means of physical laws which are invariable in their sequences. Even if God could alter the invariable character of the sequences

known as natural laws, these scientifically-minded people are quite sure that if He did so in response to human prayers, such a proceeding would be detrimental to human interests. For deeply conscious of the benefits conferred on humanity by our modern scientific knowledge, and convinced that all secure scientific progress depends upon the invariability of natural laws, they regard prayers which seem to demand a departure from this invariability, as both ineffective and foolish.

On the other hand, there are other Christians who hold that it is conceivable that God might so operate through the invariable sequences of Nature as to accomplish, in response to the prayer of faith, a result in the physical universe which, without that prayer of faith, would have been impossible. And yet do it in such a way that none of the invariable sequences of Nature's laws are broken thereby.

Whilst they regard Nature as a mechanism, and operating mechanically, yet they feel that it may be possible that the Divine Mechanic, who not only created but operates the creative mechanism, can achieve results in and through the operation of that mechanism, which that mechanism operating of itself could not achieve. Of course the belief in this possibility may be a complete delusion, or, on the other hand, it may be the outcome of a truer and deeper faith in the power of God, the lack of which belief, Christ said, did, in the case of the Sadducees, preclude their believing in the Resurrection.

Our point, however, is this : that where there are in a Christian congregation devout and intelligent people who hold diverse views on this controversial issue, it is far better that the Lord's Prayer should be used 'with special intention,' as the Primate suggests, than that specific verbal requests for rain should be uttered officially.

No doubt both schools of thought are agreed that St. Paul's advice is sound and should be acted upon by Christians in the face of all doubts and difficulties and disasters :

> 'In everything by prayer and supplication with thanksgiving let your requests be made known unto God. And the peace of God, which passeth all understanding, shall keep your hearts and minds.'

Multae terricolis linguae, coelestibus una. The prayer of the Spirit is one although uttered in many varieties of human speech.

KEEPING THE LENTEN FAST.

The following letter, which was published in the *Times* of Feb. 28, will be of interest to both Catholic and non-Catholic readers in this season of Lent:

> SIR,—In this time of Lent the problem of choosing interesting, yet appropriate Lenten, dishes presents itself in many households. May I therefore draw your readers' attention to the Lenten food which both in France and Italy is the most popular and traditional of all—*la morue* (salted codfish)? The English housewife tends to ignore this excellent and economical fish, possibly because she does not know some of the more appetizing methods of its preparation.
>
> *Soufflé de morue* is a dish favoured for many centuries in the Savoie country. For this 1 lb. of the freshly boiled and flaked fish is made into a paste with two tablespoonfuls of thick *béchamel* sauce. Season the paste and heat in a saucepan, adding the yolks of three eggs and four whites beaten to a stiff froth. Then place in a buttered saucepan and cook and serve as a *soufflé*. When served in this way, or garnished with egg or vegetable sauces, *la morue* ceases to merit such epithets as 'dull' or 'tasteless,' which are often applied to cod in this country.
>
> Yours respectfully,
>
> FRANCOIS LATRY, Maîtres des Cuisines,
> Savoy Restaurant.

Christ condemned the Pharisees who made themselves of a sad countenance that they might appear unto men to fast. Those who follow the advice of M. François Latry will be under no such temptation. They will keep their Lenten fast wreathed in smiles.

THE UNITARIAN RIGHT TO BE CALLED CHRISTIAN.

Although those who know the writings of Martineau, James Drummond, Thom, Estlin Carpenter, Dr. L. P. Jacks, and other Unitarian leaders could have no doubt as to their right to bear the name of Christian, it may be of interest to recall that this right received legal sanction in England by a decision given in the Chancery Division of the High Court in 1899.

A chapel in St. Saviourgate, York, having fallen into the hands of an Agnostic group, an action was brought by certain Unitarians to recover the use of the chapel for religious worship. The Trust Deed of the chapel defined it as 'a place for Christian people called Protestant Dissenters to worship in.' Mr. Justice Kekewich, who tried the case, ruled that the Unitarians were entitled under the Trust Deed to use the chapel. In giving judgment, he said that 'Unitarianism . . . was admittedly a form

of Christianity (it was not necessary to define in what form it differed from other Christian sects).' This ruling has the force of Common Law. The case is fully reported in the *Times* of 7th Dec., 1899, under the title *Attorney General v. Lewin.*

Many will feel grateful to the Bishop of St. Edmundsbury and Ipswich for his letter to the *Times* of March 7th in which he defends against a contributor to that journal the essential Christianity of many who cannot accept the traditional Christian dogmas. He writes :

> 'There are thousands of earnest men and women to-day, whose ideals are Christ's ideals, who possess the Christ spirit, who nevertheless find it impossible to accept the doctrinal implications of the creeds at their face value and who "follow not with us." To imply that these are against Christ seems to me the antithesis of a true Christianity. He who said that the Kingdom of Heaven was of such as possess or seek Christian qualities and who said to one who was unable to face the demands of a full Christ-following "Thou art not far from the Kingdom" would never have denied a secure place therein to those who are manifestly trying to walk in His steps, whatever their doctrinal attitude may be, and who may have a better title there than many "who profess and call themselves Christians."'

A CHRISTIAN DEMAND FOR DIVORCE REFORM

By Claud Mullins, Chairman of the Council of the Modern Churchmen's Union.

ONCE again (on 2nd February, 1934) a bill to reform the divorce laws has been 'talked out' in the House of Commons, and once again this has been due to members of Parliament having been bombarded by organizations of Christian workers in opposition to the reform proposals. This attitude would be intelligible if those who oppose reform were demanding at the same time the abolition of all divorce. But opponents of divorce reform seem content with mere opposition. No demand for the abolition of divorce is being made to-day. This leaves us with a choice between divorce reform and the *status quo*, and it is because I am convinced that the *status quo* is from the Christian standpoint so unsatisfactory that I write this article. A plea for reform from this standpoint may be of assistance to those who have agitated with so little success for twenty

years in order to secure the adoption of the reform proposals made by the majority of the Royal Commission in 1912. They would in my opinion have greater prospects of success if they approached this problem from a new angle. If they tried to persuade enlightened Christians that, as I believe, there are serious moral and religious dangers in our present situation in regard to divorce, and if they incorporated in their plan proposals for removing these dangers, they might make progress. At present they seem to be merely ploughing the sands.

We who feel the need for drastic changes in the divorce law are second to none in our devotion to the Christian ideal of marriage—life-long monogamy. We agree whole-heartedly that easy divorce laws menace that standard, and it is largely because we are convinced that our present law offends in this sense that we would plead for reform. Personally I find myself instinctively attracted to the view that there should be no divorce, and I strongly suspect that the existence of divorce creates as many disasters as it relieves. But certain practical considerations prevent me from joining with those who believe that the Christian ideal of life-long marriage should be legally compelled. In the first place, as I have just said, there is no practical proposal for the abolition of divorce. Secondly comes the fact that where there is no divorce '*a vinculo*,' there is a persistent demand for the annulment of marriage. The extent to which decrees of nullity are granted is often exaggerated by controversialists, but the fact that in some cases such decrees are granted on grounds which shock the Christian conscience is a warning against supporting any demand for the abolition of our divorce law. A further warning lies in the practical effects of judicial separation. In 1931, the last year for which official statistics exist, 24,193 applications were made to our Police Courts for separation and maintenance, and 17,097 orders were made. These figures ignore, of course, the large number of separations by mutual agreement and they do not include separations decreed by the High Court. No re-marriage is possible in any of these cases, and my experience as a Police Court magistrate compels me to endorse the words of Lord St. Helier, who was President of the Divorce Court from 1892 to 1905: 'It is a terrible thing that people should be going about the world

neither married nor unmarried, possibly liable to contract fresh and illegal matrimony and certainly exposed to temptation to commit adultery' (Johnson *v.* Johnson, 1901).

In what way do present conditions in regard to divorce offend the Christian conscience? During the twenty-two years since the report of the Commission was issued conditions under the existing law have so developed that the present state of affairs is quite different from that surveyed by the Commission. In 1857, when Parliament introduced divorce by judicial decree, it was presumably contemplated that relief should be available for the party whose spouse was in fact 'living in sin.' As 'living in sin' is very difficult to prove according to the laws of evidence, one act of adultery was deemed to be sufficient. Until recent years divorce for adultery was mainly confined to cases where adultery was real and an indication of a permanent breach of the marriage bond. The official figures support this view. The average number of decrees in the early years was about 200, and it grew slowly. In 1881-5 the annual average was 331, and in 1896-1900 it was 505; in 1908-12 (when the Commission reported) it was 658, and it was little higher at the outbreak of the Great War. But in 1932 there were 3,925 decrees. In some measure this vast increase has been caused by Parliament's acceptance in 1923 of the so-called equality of the sexes so far as divorce is concerned; it has also been induced by the suppression since 1926 of the reporting of divorce cases; another cause has been the Poor Persons Rules of the same year, and yet another the hearing of certain divorce cases at provincial towns. But when full allowances are made for these causes of increase, we must face the fact that it has been widely discovered that adultery can easily be stage-managed and the further fact that the Divorce Court has not been able to suppress collusive divorces.

To-day, to quote the experienced editor of a standard legal text-book on divorce, Mr. William Latey, 'lawyers are continuously faced with quasi-collusive acts done by couples who are determined on divorce.' In my recent book, *Marriage, Children and God* I have said that

> 'to-day even the most respectable lawyers have to be parties to the stage-management of adultery. A number of women exist whose occupation is to spend nights in hotels with intending respondents, so

> that legal evidence of adultery shall be available, and sometimes their names and addresses are even supplied to the intending respondents through their legal advisers.'

This statement caused at the time a minor sensation in the popular press, but it has never been, and cannot be, denied. It may be remembered that some years ago a well-known member of Parliament wrote to the press to explain how he had been divorced for adultery without in fact having committed the offence. The only unusual feature of this unedifying episode was its publicity.

The ugly fact has to be faced that to-day a large proportion of divorces are deliberately staged. It is equally disconcerting to know that the law is often powerless to prevent this. In fact, the efforts of the Divorce Court to prevent collusion have had unfortunate results. In effect, the Court has told the respondents that they must commit adultery in fact; lately the theory has been evolved that adultery must be committed twice if certainty of getting a divorce is desired. Are we to wait until the Court insists upon three acts of adultery, or perhaps more? Probably the majority of these people would have preferred, I hope on grounds of conscience, to have only stage-managed an appearance of adultery; and without embarking too far into moral theology, can we not say that from the moral and religious point of view it is better to obtain divorce by faking an appearance of adultery than by actually committing it? Be this as it may, what vitally concerns all Christian people is the fact that lawyers have defeated the law and that public opinion is in this matter not on the side of the law. The Minority Report of the Commission deprecated extending the grounds of divorce because such grounds would, it said, 'lend themselves to the easiest collusion.' We may reasonably doubt if there could be more collusion than there is now.

A consideration that is of great importance, and one that worries me a great deal as a magistrate, is that the loose standards that present conditions encourage are likely in time to percolate through to the wage-earning classes. At present my impression is that only deserving cases pass through the Poor Persons Rules. At present also, though the wage-earners have their own peculiar matrimonial faults, particularly in the lower

strata, the committing or faking of adultery in order to secure divorce is not among them. But social standards usually progress downwards, and, if present conditions are allowed to continue, we must expect an enormous increase in the number of divorces for adultery. It is not a pleasant subject, but deliberate, or faked, adultery is much easier for a poor man than for one who has more expensive standards; none of the difficulties about hotels and chamber-maids would stand in the way of those among whom intercourse in the street is by no means unusual. As one whose daily work involves the hearing of domestic disputes, I am appalled at the possibilities, and at the effect on Christian standards, if once the poorer sections of the community learn to behave in the matter of divorce as those who up to now have been the main *clientèle* of the Divorce Court.

Another thoroughly dangerous feature of our present law is that divorce decrees can be, and sometimes are, pronounced within a year of marriage. The Court would be powerless if anyone determined to have an annual marriage and divorce. We must remember that in the Divorce Court no attempt is made to investigate the whole circumstances of the marriage or to bring about a reconciliation. The Court has to regard a divorce case as purely a matter of law and has no machinery for social enquiry. Only lawyers and court officials deal with the cases. An undefended divorce case ordinarily takes about five minutes in court, and that is usually all that the Judge sees of it. Our law acts on the view that once adultery is proved according to law divorce is a right. This aspect of the problem is more urgent now than ever in view of the increase in poor persons' divorces, and it will become more and more serious as time goes on. In Police Courts (where most domestic disputes, except divorce, are dealt with) the legal assumption that domestic disputes are solely a matter of litigation is in fact modified by the splendid labours of the Court Missionaries, mostly provided, a Churchman may be proud to say, by Church of England societies. Even in Police Courts there is considerable room for improvement, and I am hopeful that before long a Bill will be introduced into Parliament with the object of strengthening the conciliatory work of Police Courts in domestic disputes. At the present moment the legal world is stirred by a recommendation of Lord

Hanworth's Committee on the Business of the Courts that the Divorce Court should be part of the King's Bench Division of the High Court. It matters little from the Christian standpoint if this change be made or not. The big problem is whether High Court Judges should be concerned with the divorce cases of the poorer sections of the community at all. Their time is too valuable and they have not as a rule the social experience necessary to conduct a genuine enquiry into matrimonial life. Yet is not such an enquiry necessary? I realise the practical difficulties, especially where respondents refuse to appear in court. But my experience as a magistrate has convinced me that the settling of domestic disputes is not only a matter of law and that lawyers alone are not competent to deal with them. Respondents are far more likely to appear in a social investigation than in litigation. We nearly always manage to induce them to come to the Police Court. 'Bright Young Things' might resent judicial enquiry and admonition, but the more experience I have of domestic work in the Police Courts, the more convinced I am that at least wage-earners appreciate enquiry and help in their matrimonial troubles. It seems to me that one of the essential elements in divorce reform should be the creation of matrimonial courts, presided over by judicial officers of a lower status than High Court Judges, whose duty should be, before deciding an issue, to investigate the whole circumstances as fully as possible, and who will work in conjunction with religious, social and medical experts, the latter being called in aid where necessary. I have never enthused over the 'Poor Persons Rules' in the High Court, though while at the Bar I at one time helped in working them; as more and more use is likely to be made of them, it becomes more and more urgent that the matrimonial affairs of poor people should not be dealt with by the present method. A few minutes' attention by a High Court Judge, concerned only with the legal issue 'Has adultery been proved according to law?' is inadequate.

Another matter for serious consideration by Christians is the section of the Act of 1857 which laid it down that 'the Court shall not be bound to pronounce a decree if it finds that a petitioner has during the marriage been guilty of adultery.' Until this century the Divorce Court took a strict view of this discre-

tion. But circumstances have since compelled the Court to use its discretion freely. In the important decision of Apted *v.* Apted and Bliss (1930) the following figures relating to the exercise of this judicial discretion were given: from 1857 to 1909 it was asked for 45 times; between 1910 and 1919 the number was 64; but between 1920 and 1929 the number rose to 690. The annual average is, therefore, about 88 times greater. The position now is, to quote Mr. Latey again, that 'in practice relief is refused nowadays only in the most flagrant cases of defiant deception of the court.' This development has an important bearing in considering whether the Church can reasonably distinguish between the 'guilty' and the 'innocent' party. Ever since 1857 a clergyman of the Established Church may only refuse to 'solemnize the marriage of any person whose former marriage may have been dissolved on the ground of his or her adultery' He is bound, therefore, to re-marry the 'innocent' party, and he has to allow the use of his church if an incumbent can be found who will re-marry either 'innocent' or 'guilty' party, even if the 'innocent' party has only obtained his or her divorce by obtaining the judicial discretion. By opposing divorce reform Christians are perpetuating these unsatisfactory conditions. One of the features of divorce reform should be that the clergy should be relieved from all obligation to re-marry the parties to a divorce suit. This matter has special importance because here lies the ground on which there could be a serious conflict between Church and State, a conflict which, one regrets to say, would be as welcome to some inside the Church as to some of its opponents outside. But if the State widened the present relief to the Church and left the matter to the decision of the individual clergy (who alone can be in the position to know the real facts), the possibility of such conflict would be reduced to a minimum.

Another matter of importance in this connection is that the present law insists on abstention from adultery by a petitioner between 'decree *nisi*' and 'decree absolute' (usually a period of six months), and the King's Proctor is employed to assist the Court in securing the observance of this demand. But in reality the King's Proctor only intervenes when flagrant adultery has been brought to his attention, and the great majority of cases pass to 'decree absolute' without investigation. It is difficult to

approve this kind of official espionage, or the law which compels it. It does not exist in Scotland. It may well be doubted whether the activities of the King's Proctor have not been on the whole harmful. Another ineffective attempt of the law to prevent relief to the guilty is the Divorce Court rule that insists upon an affidavit by all petitioners to the effect that there has been no collusion or connivance between petitioner and respondent. One of the effects of this seems to be to promote wholesale perjury.

Christians should, I would suggest, begin their reconsideration of the divorce problem by realizing that present conditions bring marriage into contempt and encourage the contracting of marriage 'unadvisedly, lightly and wantonly, to satisfy men's carnal lusts and appetites.' The first reform is to secure that the existing facilities for divorce on the ground of adultery be curtailed. I would suggest that an essential condition of reform is that, come what may, a marriage shall not be dissolved for four years, though temporary relief by separation should, as now, be granted in cases of necessity. But it will not be possible to clean up our present Augean stable of divorce for adultery without allowing certain other grounds for divorce. If the Church would approach the problem from the standpoint that existing conditions are a scandal in a professedly Christian civilization, the question of admitting fresh grounds for divorce would largely solve itself in a search for methods of obtaining better conditions.

When we come to consider grounds for divorce other than adultery our task should be to search for such grounds as have really made a mockery of the marriage. The basis of our search could well be, as was said in a statement prepared by the Modern Churchmen's Union in 1923, that 'the matter ought to be decided on grounds of Christian expediency.' Our present difficulties have resulted because our forefathers were content to base the national law upon a literal interpretation of Our Lord's teaching as recorded in St. Matthew's Gospel. The task now is to study the spirit of Christian teaching rather than the letter. The words 'except for fornication' are not a sure basis for a national law of divorce. In settling the problem of divorce on the principle of Christian expediency we should be acting in full accord with the historic policy of the Christian Church. The validity of the exception recorded in St. Matthew has long been disputed, but

whatever view of this problem of exegesis be taken, it seems that the presence of these words in St. Matthew is proof that from the beginning the Church did not regard it as its duty to accept Our Lord's ideal of monogamy terminable only by death as a legal basis of social life. If Jesus Himself used the words 'except for fornication,' He showed that He did not expect that legislation binding on all and sundry should be on the same exalted level as the ideal He taught. But if, as seems more likely, the exception is an editorial addition, it is evidence that from earliest times Christian leaders accepted the view that the ideal of indissoluble marriage cannot be enforced by legislation. Both exegetical views lead, then, to the belief that Christian duty now is to enact such laws as will be likely to bring about the nearest practicable approach to the Christian standard.

Christian reformers of our divorce law should, I would suggest, challenge the fundamental assumption of the law of 1857, namely, that adultery is either in itself a reason for immediate divorce or the only reason for any divorce. Our Lord did not regard adultery as necessarily the worst of sins. To the woman taken in adultery He said, 'Neither do I condemn thee. Go and sin no more.' He was far more severe, for instance, with the man who was told what he should do with his worldly possessions but refused. We can claim to be in accordance with Christian tradition when we search for causes that really have destroyed a marriage and, after reasonable delay and effort at reconciliation, allow them to be grounds for divorce. I believe that the late Lord Birkenhead was right when in his famous speech in the House of Lords he said that 'the spiritual and moral sides of marriage are incomparably more important than the physical side.'[1] To base a divorce law on adultery only is to observe the letter of a disputed text and to ignore the whole spirit of Our Lord's teaching about which there is no dispute.

To-day, largely because adultery is in effect the only ground for divorce, men and women are driven to think, talk and write about it, and to commit it. So little is adultery despised to-day that in certain circles a man is considered a cad if he does not permit his wife to divorce him by committing or faking it. This is disastrous to public morals. In countries where divorce is

[1] *Points of View*, Vol. I, p. 214.

granted for other grounds adultery plays a very minor part in matrimonial disputes, and public attention is not, therefore, perpetually being directed to it. Scotland has known divorce for four years' desertion since 1573, and the condition of society there is, so far as morals in marriage are concerned, at least no worse than in our country. Christians would not take many of the States in America as examples to emulate, but it is noteworthy that in States where divorce can be obtained for desertion, cruelty and adultery, only about nine per cent. of the divorces are on the ground of adultery.[2]

If adultery ceased to be in itself a reason for immediate divorce, some relief must, of course, continue to be given where adultery makes married life impossible. Adultery should, therefore, be made a ground for separation, to be convertible into divorce at the option of the petitioning party after a period of years. To-day adultery is a ground for judicial separation, and often Judges of the Divorce Court have protested against being asked to make decrees of separation where divorce could be granted. But adultery is not a ground for separation in the Police Court, although the issue of adultery frequently comes before these courts in another connection. If adultery were made in the first place only a ground for separation (in all courts having matrimonial jurisdiction), there would be opportunity for the adjustment of all questions of alimony, custody of children, etc. Then if after four years the petitioning party wished for divorce, divorce could be granted. Where the marriage has already lasted four years or more before the act of adultery complained of, I would suggest that the courts be given power to decree divorce at any period not less than one year after the order for separation.

But such a reform must be impracticable unless grounds for divorce other than adultery are accepted. Otherwise the temptation to chicanery and collusion (which, as I have said, the courts cannot even attempt to prevent without serious moral results) will continue unabated. The true way to prevent collusion is the provision of laws which give relief where relief is necessary according to Christian principles. For the rest, the Churches must rely upon their moral influence to create a public opinion that is unfavourable to chicanery. If the reforms I have so far sug-

[2] See *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 14th edition, Vol. VII, p. 459.

gested were carried out, I believe that Christians could accept with a clear conscience the recommendations in the Majority Report of the Royal Commission. These are (i) wilful desertion for three years (I would prefer four years, so as to bring English law into line with that of Scotland); (ii) persistent cruelty; (iii) incurable insanity after five years' confinement; (iv) habitual drunkenness found incurable after three years from a first order of separation; and (v) imprisonment under a commuted death sentence. There are practical difficulties in some of these proposed grounds, but they could be got over, and so far as the Churches are concerned it seems to me that, within reason, the acceptance of this or that ground for divorce is less important than the obtaining of a new spirit in the adjustment of matrimonial differences which would, one may reasonably hope, be the result of the reforms suggested above.

Concurrent with a demand from the Churches for divorce reform, I should like to see a determined attempt by the Churches to secure the better instruction of those whom they marry, especially in regard to sexual conduct in marriage. It is the experience of most of those who have had to deal with matrimonial disaster that the difficulties are often of a sexual nature, and that these difficulties have arisen from the ignorance of the parties. I pleaded for this in my book *Marriage, Children and God*, and the response from the clergy and the Church press has been encouraging. With others I am now working to get suitable literature made available to the clergy. The Life and Witness Committee of the Lambeth Conference pronounced emphatically in favour of such instruction:

> 'We think that there should be special preparation for marriage for persons between their engagement and the wedding . . . We acknowledge that, although the Church has set before her members the highest ideal of marriage, she has done but little to train them for it.'

This view was endorsed in the Archbishop's Encyclical Letter. When the Church acts up to this advice—and at present practically nothing is being done by the parochial clergy, save here and there—then there is likely to be far less resort to the Divorce Court.

Were the reforms suggested here introduced, at once frivolous marriages would be checked, for no final relief would be available for at least four years; at once the undesirable promin-

ence of adultery would cease, as the big majority of unhappy couples would here, as elsewhere, prefer the more decent, and I would add the more Christian, procedure of divorce for desertion. During the years before a decree of divorce could be pronounced the complaining party could be amply protected under the terms of the Separation Order. Further, there would be little collusive adultery since the inducement would be removed: no longer would the Divorce Court be, in effect, teaching unhappy couples that they must really commit adultery. Adultery would cease to play the unhealthy important rôle in married life that it does now, and we could reasonably hope that it would in consequence play a less prominent rôle in social life, fiction and the drama. We should escape the very real danger that confronts us that the low standards of those who have hitherto resorted most to the Divorce Court may percolate through the community. Divorce would no longer be easy for anyone, but it would be available in all reasonable cases. The possession of money necessary to pay lawyers who are expert in the law and practice of collusion would no longer be a usual preliminary to divorce. Finally, the danger of a clash between Church and State would be avoided.

In putting forward this plea for a Christian demand for divorce reform, I would end by quoting the warning given by the Archbishop of Canterbury in his Encyclical Letter at the last Lambeth Conference:

> 'We appear to be largely pre-occupied with dogmatic and ecclesiastical questions remote from common concerns. And so religion often seems to remain in a backwater, while the main streams of life flow past it, untouched and unaffected . . . It is for us in the Church who believe in and try to live according to the Gospel of the Incarnation to humanize religion, if we would commend it to our generation.'

Nothing would be more likely to restore the position of the Church in the eyes of the public (the Lambeth Committee on Youth and Vocation admitted that 'a not inconsiderable section is alienated from the Church and all organized religion') than that the Church should now give the lead in an endeavour to bring our laws of divorce as near as possible to the Christian standard.

A STUDY OF THE SOCIAL & RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY OF N. A. BERDYAEV

By Irene M. Hubbard.

THE somewhat ambiguous term 'liberalism' is unpopular in these days. To many it conveys little more than a political programme of half-hearted social reform. To others (and amongst them is the subject of this short study) it stands for an effete social policy, suspect from its inception, by reason of the rationalistic philosophy from which it sprang. But those who regard Liberalism as primarily an attitude of mind will be inclined to think that so long as education is permitted to inculcate a love of truth for its own sake, to train the young in appreciation of natural beauty, and to uphold goodness as the highest of human values, so long will Liberalism persist.

In this sense the teaching of Professor Berdyaev is essentially liberal in character despite his relegation of all forms of political Liberalism to the limbo of an age outworn. But before we proceed to an examination of his philosophy a short account of this remarkable, but (in England) little-known, personality may be of interest.

Nicholas Alexandrovich Berdyaev was born in 1874 at Kiev. His book, *Christianity and the Class War*, is dedicated to the memory of Karl Marx, 'the social master of my youth and whose opponent in ideas I have now become.' When 25 years of age he was exiled to the north of Russia, and in 1917 threatened with banishment for his criticisms of the Orthodox Church. After the Revolution he was appointed to the chair of Philosophy in Moscow University. But, prophets being anathema to revolution as to reaction, he was expelled, after two periods of imprisonment, as 'an upholder of religion.' He lived for a time in Berlin and finally settled in Paris, where he directs the Academy of Religious Philosophy, which he founded. He edits a review, *Put* (*The Way*). Many of his writings have been published in Germany. His books published in England are *The End of Our Time*, *The Russian Revolution* and *Christianity and Class War*. He contributed an article on 'Communist Secularism' to the com-

posite volume *Christianity and the Crisis*. He is a member of the Orthodox Church, but his liberal tendencies cause him to be regarded as a heretic and a dangerous 'Modernist.'

It would seem that in this one-time disciple of Karl Marx all the romantic elements in the Russian character, its gentleness, its mysticism, its indifference to worldly values, have come to birth. Berdyaev is in the line of Tolstoi and Dostoievsky and the other pre-revolutionary writers. But in him an intense awareness of the spiritual world is balanced by intellectual breadth and power and an all-too-rare insight into the complex drama of human history and the lessons to be learnt therefrom.

At the base of all his philosophy lies the conviction of what may perhaps be least inadequately described as the objective reality of God. The Liberal mind is apt to conceive of God as immanent rather than transcendent. But, for Berdyaev, God, Truth, Right, have an existence independent of man's apprehension of them. In this he approximates to the position of Karl Barth.

The social implications of Berdyaev's philosophy might be expressed by the command to 'Seek first the Kingdom of God, and all these things shall be added unto you.' The originality of his teaching lies in the fact that to him these words are not a pious aspiration but a sober reality. The Kingdom of God is not a materialist Paradise where pain and effort are excluded and sin has been disposed of by the simple expedient of lowering the moral standard. The Kingdom of Heaven is an inner spiritual life where sin and pain are transcended in the vision of God. The secret of Christianity is that by 'seeking first for Heaven and everlasting life there, it adds beauty and power to mortal life on earth.' Earthly well-being is a bye-product of a spiritual process which has for its end the glory of God.

In *The End of Our Time* Berdyaev develops the thesis that our present civilization is in process of decomposition, that we are entering upon such another dark age as that which followed the fall of the Western Empire. As the mediaeval civilization arose out of that period of confusion and apparent sterility, so may a new culture arise out of the chaos that is before us to-day. In this culture the spirit of the Middle Ages may express itself in new forms. For Berdyaev the germ of all true civilization is

the religious temper. He regards the Renaissance as an inevitable episode in the evolution of human mentality, but bearing within itself the seeds of the present decay. At the back of all that magnificent flowering of the creative faculties was the pent-up store of religious energy accumulated in the human soul by the asceticism of the Middle Ages. The Church was the power-house from which the energy of Humanism sprang. But now the power is waning like the power of an exhausted dynamo, and there is no renewal possible for us who have turned from the fountain-head of interior spiritual life. Not until we make contact again with the source of spiritual being, with the Godhead, shall we receive power to build again a civilization compatible with the dignity of man.

The Humanism of the Renaissance, so Berdyaev believes, took a false turn. It became anthropocentric instead of theocentric. 'Man without God is no longer man.'

> 'European man strode into modern history full of confidence in himself and in his creative powers; in this dawn all seemed to depend on his own power of making to which he put neither frontier nor limits; to-day he leaves it to pass into an unknown epoch, discouraged, his faith in shreds—that faith which he had in his own powers and the strength of his own skill—threatened with the loss forever of the core of his personality.' [1]

To those familiar with the philosophy of modern scientific materialism this somewhat startling statement will be understandable. However we may try to evade recognizing the fact, modern psychology teaches us that we are automata, puppets dancing to the strings pulled by the unseen force of our instinctive impulses. An eminent scientist declares quite frankly that psychology is out to relieve man of the burden of his soul, and hopes that ultimately 'we shall discover in our own behaviour nothing conscious, nothing voluntary, but only complicated combinations of physical reflexes functioning automatically in a causal nexus.' [2] A far cry indeed from the faith of Erasmus, who contended against Martin Luther for the freedom of the human will.

> 'Contemporary Europe has been very urgent in the betrayal of the Christian revelation of human personality and has thrown it to the wolves of primary impulse and instinct, thereby insinuating into the heart of civilization a disorderly principle which can plunge her into a chaos of barbarism.' [3]

[1] *The End of our Time*, p. 15.
[2] *Christianity and the Crisis*, p. 534.
[3] *End of Our Time*, p. 62.

> 'Humanism at its beginnings was still close to Christianity: it drank at two springs, antiquity and the Christian religion. It was creative and splendid in its work only in the measure of its nearness to the Faith; when it deserted its spiritual depths and came to the surface it began to degenerate. But it did not set itself to regard man without God at once and at one blow. Such a severance was not in the humanism of Pico della Mirandola, of Erasmus, and of many another mind of the Renaissance. Nevertheless there was always the seed of contradiction within Humanism, and from it has grown the humanism of these last times wherein we have seen the final harvest nothing less than the negation of man.'[4]

Berdyaev finds this mechanizing and disintegrating tendency in the realm of art and letters as well as in that of science. He has some very obvious truths to tell, which, so far as the present writer is aware, have never been told before, about 'Futurism,' under which term he evidently includes the whole catalogue of isms, 'Dadaism,' 'Gagaism,' and the like. He sees it as a turning away from what was good and true in the Renaissance, a betrayal of the almost terrible nobleness and power that gave us Michael Angelo and Leonardo—a denial of the whole philosophy of art that looked to nature and to antiquity for its inspiration. Instead, it turns to the machine, and, not content with that, proceeds to break the machine, along with man and nature, into a thousand fragments, destroying identity and intelligibility in frantic pursuit of some 'inwardness' which only its initiates can understand. In the modern school of poetry the same state of things is to be found. Berdyaev gives as an example the verse of Andrew Biely, but anyone familiar with the work of T. S. Eliot and his school will recognize in it the same elements of ugliness and 'ex-centricity' that distinguish modernist art. 'This decomposition,' says Berdyaev, 'was prepared by Impressionism, wherein the soul deliquesced in sensation. Man's centre was gone, and, having to look for support within himself, he spoiled his own image.' For Berdyaev, like all Christian Humanists, values that sanctified beauty which is the fruit of a disciplined spiritual life. The hideousness that appals us in the faces of the Russian Communists is for him a sign of their alienation from the grace of spiritual being. 'Ugliness is always a sign of ontological corruption.'

In the teaching of Karl Marx, Berdyaev finds the last fruit of a godless humanism, the final and complete negation of man.

[4] *End of Our Time*, pp. 27 and 28.

Beside his exposition of the philosophy of the Russian Revolution, other interpretations seem shallow and partial. He reveals it as a religion, a fanaticism, as irrational and inhuman as that of Torquemada:

> 'Even that liberty of thought which was the motive of the Renaissance disappears in collectivism. Every form of thought is under compulsion, controlled by a sectarian centralization: that is to say that collectivism is a return to the Middle Ages but on a materialistic, anti-religious basis.'

Man as a personality has ceased in Soviet Russia. Even as a factor in the evolution of the Marxian State he is rejected. The revolutionary philosophy is being formulated, not by individual genius, but by the collectivist policy.[5]

In the concluding section of *The End of Our Time*, Berdyaev traces the tangled threads of Soviet philosophy, the great basic dogmas of 'materialism' and the 'class-war,' the heresies of 'mechanicism' and 'dialectical idealism,' the doctrines of 'class-truth' and 'proletarian science'—he traces them all down to the central tenet of Communism, the supreme article of faith, namely, 'the collective,' the corporate state, that which has for the Marxist the value of God. This 'collective' must not be identified with any existing state of society. It is the final stage in the evolution of the class-struggle and will arise when all but proletarian values have been rooted from the earth and rationalism is supreme.

Let no one imagine from the foregoing that Berdyaev is in any sense a reactionary. Nothing could be further from the truth. His abhorrence of 'capitalism' is as thoroughgoing as that of the most devout Marxist. His condemnation of the 'bourgeoisie' will seem to many extreme and unjust.[6] It might be said that he out-Marxes the Marxists, for a part of his condemnation is that they are themselves possessed by the bourgeois spirit. 'The Communist,' he says, 'is the perfect bourgeois who has won his final victory and become collective man, embracing the whole earth. . . . The socialist and communist ideal of man is the same as that of the bourgeois, "economic man" who, without personality and soul, is exclusively concerned with the technical organization of life.'

[5] See *The End of Our Time*, p. 212.
[6] See *Christianity and Class War*.

It is, of course, obvious that the Communist, whose ideal of human society presupposes a background of complex and highly-organized industrialism — 'the dismal Paradise of a hygienic factory' — accepts unquestioningly the increasing industrialisation of human existence for which 'capitalism' must be held responsible. It is this absorption in the material processes of industry that Berdyaev condemns.

The redemption of human society will come, he thinks, by spiritual ways. Yet he is convinced that the capitalist system must be transcended. He does not offer any cut-and-dried scheme for social salvation, nor does he state very clearly his ideal of organized human society. He believes in a 'theocracy,' that is, a society orientated not upon man, in and for himself, but upon God. It is doubtful if he would consent to tone down this conception by substituting for 'God' such terms as 'absolute values,' 'the spiritual nature of man,' or like abstractions. For, to him, God is not an abstraction, but as much a fact of existence as man himself. This is the foundation of his humanism.

It is remarkable how reminiscent of English liberal religious thought are his views of the nature of the Christian Church. Reading them, we are carried back in thought to the days when Arnold of Rugby and Frederick Denison Maurice were upholding a broader, more living ideal of the Christian society against the rigid and mechanical concept of the Tractarians. In the following passage it is possible that Berdyaev has the Orthodox Church in mind, but has it not an application to the Church of England to-day?

> 'Her life is developing unseen, outside official lines, for her boundaries are not clearly marked and cannot be pointed out as if they were a material object. The life of the Church is a mystery and her ways cannot be understood by reason alone: the Spirit breatheth where He will, and creative movements appear, which, from the external, official, simply rationalist point of view seem strange and foreign to the Church . . . . The Christianity of the Oecumenical councils and the great doctors has not yet sufficiently exhausted the great truths about man and the universe. The Church is cosmic by nature and contains within herself the fullness of Being: she is the universe baptized . . . .
>
> 'Christianity has reached a stage in which the intellect will play an increasingly important part as it did in the days of the great teachers beginning with Clement of Alexandria. The "people" are being led away from the faith by atheistic propaganda and by Communism, but the "intellectuals" are coming back to it.'[7]

[7] *The End of Our Time*, p. 108 and 109.

In *Christianity and Class War* Berdyaev, while repudiating violence and hatred as inconsistent with Christian ethics, sanctions 'certain kinds of social pressure' for the reformation of society. 'We must not repudiate a class war.' But when we come to examine his idea of 'class war' it seems to be little more than the application of those principles which inspired the social legislation of English Liberalism. Also he repeatedly repudiates a class-mentality as inconsistent with Christianity. He looks for the supersession of both Capitalism and Communism by an entirely new set of political institutions that will combine the virtues of 'democratic' and 'aristocratic' government. 'We must have a much more simple and elementary material culture and a spiritual culture that is far more complex.' He desires the rise of a new asceticism which, by checking the indefinite expansion of material wants, will cut the ground from under the feet of the capitalist. He does not advocate the abolition of private property, but its control, so as to avoid the accumulation of large private fortunes. Competition is to be replaced by co-operation. Representation will be on a trade and professional basis. Organizations of the nature of the old craft-guilds will arise, and town and country will again be linked together. Groups based upon the trades and the arts will take the place of the present castes and classes. Democracy, aristocracy, monarchy, as we know them to-day, will end, and will be replaced by a natural 'hierarchism' based on innate differences in human capacity. The present artificial distinctions due to birth and wealth will be entirely obliterated. Yet

> 'life cannot prosper without a spiritual aristocracy. The structure of a state and the constitution of its social order should always display inequality and heirarchy and lodge sovereignty only in a determined *part* of the body politic.'

Power will not be *possessed* by the people; it will be delegated by the people. Yet they themselves will decide what forms shall express this governmental power.

> 'Life will become more austere, without its modern showiness. A very strong tension will be set up for the human spirit and a particular sort of monastic life in the world, a kind of new religious order, may emerge.' [8]

Above all, religion, not the external rule of an ecclesiastical

[8] *End of Our Time*, p. 116.

hierarchy, but the ageless, earth-transcendant flame in the soul of man, will revive, to be the inspiring and sustaining force in every activity of human life. We are reminded of the famous words of J. Addington Symonds:

> 'These things shall be. A loftier race
> Than e'er the world has known shall rise
> With flame of freedom in their souls
> And light of knowledge in their eyes.'

Yet Berdyaev is too much of a realist, and also too much of a Russian, to envisage anything in the nature of an earthly paradise. The pessimistic attitude of his race with regard to all mundane affairs is often visible in his writings:

> 'The future is doubtful and I do not believe that we are obliged to look forward to a period of radiance and joy. The illusions of earthly happiness no longer have any hold on us, and the sense of evil becomes stronger and more acute in the middle ages: the powers of wickedness will grow and take on new forms wherewith to plague us in new ways. But freedom of spirit, liberty to choose his path, has been given to man. Christians must will the creation of a Christian society and culture, putting before all things the search for the Kingdom of God and his justice.'[9]

ELOI, ELOI, LAMA SABACHTHANI?

By the Editor.

THE words *Eloi, Eloi, lama sabachthani*[1] uttered by Jesus on the Cross present no little difficulty to students of His life. In the language of theology they are taken to announce the dereliction—our Lord's sense of His desertion by His Divine Father, when, as the expiatory sacrifice for the sins of the world, He experienced the awful despair of a soul that realizes that it is eternally damned. The authority for the historicity of this utterance is weighty. It occurs in St. Mark's Gospel, the most archaic of the four Gospels; the Gospel which was universally believed in the early Christian Church to preserve St. Peter's memoirs of his Lord. It occurs also in St. Matthew's Gospel, and in both these Gospels it is the only utterance ascribed to Jesus on the Cross. Moreover the words are in Aramaic or Hebrew—the texts here are confused and the words

[9] *End of Our Time*, p. 119.

[1] *St. Mark* xv, 34, and *St. Matthew* xxvii, 46.

are given in what is a mixture of both languages. Aramaic was, as we know to-day, the language in which Jesus taught, and phrases in that language which occur in the Gospels have a particularly strong claim to be regarded as the actual words of the Lord. There are, however, some considerations on the other side.

(1) Although these words occur in the Petrine Gospel, yet St. Peter himself could not have been there to hear them, for we are told that all the disciples forsook Jesus and fled, and in the various records of the death of the Saviour, although some women seem to have stood near the Cross, and a late tradition places with them the beloved disciple, yet it seems improbable that St. Peter, after his threefold denial of his Lord, could have been there. Still, he may have been in the crowd some distance away, and may at that distance have heard the words, for according to the account, Jesus cried out with a loud voice when He uttered them. Moreover St. Mark, the author of the Gospel, may have heard them.[2] Another fact which casts doubt upon the words rises from St. Mark's statement that 'Certain of those that stood by and heard were saying, See he calls Elias,' which clearly indicates that it was possible even for those who were close to the Cross to be in doubt as to what Jesus actually did say.

(2) A second objection to the words lies in the fact that in their form of address to God they are not characteristic of the Saviour. He taught His disciples to call God, Father (*Abba*), and He Himself seems always to have used this form of address to God. St. Luke's words from the Cross, addressed to the Divine Father, possess this characteristic: Father, forgive them for they know not what they do; Father, into Thy hands I commend my spirit. The other words from the Cross recorded in St. Luke and St. John — To-day shalt thou be with me in Paradise (St. Luke); Woman, behold thy son; son, behold thy mother (St. John); I thirst (St. John); It is finished (St. John) — are not addressed to God. So that, of the seven words from the Cross, three of which are addressed to God, the two Lukan words possess our Lord's characteristic form of prayer, but the only word given by Mark and Matthew does not possess it.

[2] He was quite possibly the young man with the linen cloth wrapped round his naked body who followed Jesus after His arrest on the night of the betrayal (*Mark* xiv, 51).

Against this, it is contended that the word *Eloi, Eloi, lama sabachthani* is not primarily a Word of Jesus. It is an Old Testament quotation, the opening of the 22nd Psalm. This raises the question as to whether Jesus was in the habit of citing the Old Testament in order to express Himself, and whether He is likely to have done so in addressing God on such an occasion as this. What is most notable about the teaching of Jesus is its originality both in substance and form and the personal authority which marked its style and utterance. 'What is this? A new teaching.' 'He spoke to them as having authority and not as the Scribes.' 'It was said by them of old time . . . but I say unto you.' As the Latin poet said of himself, it was not his habit to express himself in the words of any master: so we may also say of Jesus. In His agony in the Garden of Gethsemane we observe that in addressing God He adheres to His original and constant form of invocation: *Abba*, Father. In the face of this constant practice of Jesus it is difficult to feel that He is addressing His Divine Father as *Eloi, Eloi.*

The words then, *Eloi, Eloi, lama sabachthani*, must be considered as primarily a citation from the Old Testament. But do they, in that case, express the innermost conviction of Jesus? Some have held that they were uttered as He was lapsing into a condition of unconsciousness—the repetition of one of the many psalms which Jesus must have known by heart but not necessarily expressive of the conscious mind of Jesus. It is possible that this is so.

Others have maintained that the opening words of Psalm 22 should not be taken apart from the whole tenor of that psalm, which although it opens with a despairing complaint of the Divine desertion, passes into a confident conviction of Divine deliverance:

> 'For he hath not despised, nor abhorred, the low estate of the poor; he hath not hid his face from him, but when he called upon him he heard him' (v. 24).

It is possible that Jesus may have intended to cite the whole psalm, but the intervention of death did not permit Him to get past the opening words. Mr. Middleton Murry, in his *Life of Jesus*, seems almost unaccountably to omit this possible interpretation of the words *Eloi, Eloi, lama sabachthani.* He writes:

> 'He uttered all He was into one great despairing cry. . . . It may conceivably be that that despairing song had been throbbing through His soul while He hung in pain and ignominy: All they that see me laugh me to scorn; they shoot out the lip; they toss the head; "He trusted in the Lord. Let the Lord rescue him. Let the Lord rescue him, if He careth for him." But the voice of utter despair is ever the same — the cry "My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken me?"' (p. 309).

These are some of the preliminary difficulties connected with this Word from the Cross. But here it ought to be noted that though this Word does present difficulties to us to-day, difficulties which may even touch the rightfulness of our Lord's claim to be the Christ, yet apparently it presented no difficulty to the primitive Christian Church in the earliest stage of its existence. There is good reason for supposing that these very words, believed to have been uttered by Jesus almost at the moment of His death, and on the Cross of His shame, were regarded by His primitive Jewish disciples as a proof of His Messiahship, and a very important proof.

This Psalm 22 is a Messianic psalm, and, like the 53rd chapter of Isaiah, it expresses the emotions and experiences of the Suffering Servant of the Lord. The primitive Jewish Christian Church beheld in these Divine oracles the predicted sufferings of Jesus and His fulfilment of them. What could be more appropriate or more effective than that the Divine Sufferer Himself on the Cross should with His dying lips begin the recitation of one of these predictions? I think it was in response to this view that the earliest evangelist, followed by the most Jewish of his fellow-evangelists, recorded this Word of the Cross.

Yet quite early these words did present a difficulty to Christian believers (possibly Gentile Christians). It cannot be by accident that they are omitted from St. Luke's Gospel and from St. John's Gospel — each of whom give us three Words from the Cross, though none of them are the same. These evangelists must have felt that there was some objection to the word *Eloi, Eloi, lama sabachthani*. The objection may have been that they did not regard them as historical and so omitted them. But it is more likely that they regarded them as open to misconstruction and misinterpretation by Gentile readers and so omitted them on this account. We wish to stress emphatically the phrase 'by Gentile

readers,' for whilst St. Mark's and St. Matthew's Gospels are strongly Jewish Christian, and are intended primarily for Jewish Christians, St. Luke's and St. John's are Gospels intended for the Greek Christian world, and Greek Christians would not attach the same importance, or perhaps even the same significance, to a citation from the Old Testament Scriptures as would Jewish Christians.

But there may have been another reason for the omission of this Word from the Cross by both Luke and John. Very early some of the Gnostic Christian sects, including some of the Jewish Christian Gnostics, attached much importance to this text to prove their particular theory of the Person of Christ. These early heretics held the view that the man, Jesus of Nazareth, who was entirely human, was entered at the time of His Baptism by a Divine Being (*Aeon*), Christ. That this Divine Aeon operated in and through Jesus during the period of His ministry but left Him on the Cross. It was at the moment that the Divine Aeon-Christ left the Man-Jesus that the Man-Jesus uttered the words *Eloi, Eloi, lama sabachthani.* But these words were not interpreted as in the psalm, 'My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken me?' but rather 'My Strength, my Strong One, why hast Thou forsaken me?' for in the Semitic languages *el* or *al* means primarily, not God, but the Strong One. It may have been in order to give no encouragement to this primitive Gnostic teaching, which in all probability was already in existence, that St. Luke and St. John omitted this Word of the Cross. From quite an early date, however—that is, as soon as the Gospels received canonical authority and were regarded as verbally inspired by the Holy Spirit—this Word of the Cross was accepted by the Christian Church as actually uttered by Jesus.

John Calvin, the great theologian of the Reformation, as Thomas Aquinas was of mediaeval scholasticism, interpreted this Word of the Cross as teaching the completeness of the expiatory experience of our Lord. In order that our Lord might be in the fullest and completest sense the expiatory sacrifice for sin which the Divine Father required in order that He might righteously forgive the sins of mankind, it was necessary that He who was to be the expiatory sacrifice, while remaining abso-

lutely sinless, should Himself realize to the uttermost the sense of the guilt of sin and the terrible experience of utter separation from God which that sense of sin inflicts. It was, so Calvin taught, that He, the Sinless Saviour, might experience the hopeless agony of a damned soul, and its utter separation from God, that was expressed by this Word of the Cross — the Word of the Dereliction or the Divine Desertion.

This has been, at any rate for some centuries past, the orthodox dogmatic interpretation of this Word of the Cross. It will no doubt seem an adequate and satisfactory interpretation to those who believe the dogma that Jesus offered on the Cross an expiatory sacrifice for the sins of mankind; but to those who do not believe this dogma, but interpret the sacrifice of the Cross, not as an expiatory sacrifice for the sins of mankind, but as the vicarious or martyr sufferings of Jesus on behalf of His Gospel of the Love of God, Calvin's interpretation of the significance of the words *Eloi, Eloi, lama sabachthani* will seem incredible, if not abhorent.

The other extreme of interpretation is that of the modern secularist who sees in this dying utterance of the great Self-Deceiver the confession of His deception. This is, of course, a very simple and obvious way in which to interpret these words. It finds its justification in that principle succinctly expressed in Occam's Razor:

> 'Entities ought not to be multiplied beyond what is necessary.'

Yet while simple enough, it is possible that the interpretation is so superficial as to be false, particularly if it should do for us what it does for the secularist, and lead us to interpret Jesus and His mission as the supreme example of self-deception.

Jesus created a profound impression of sincerity and truth in the minds of those most nearly associated with Him in His earthly life. That profound impression has been transmitted to later generations by the Gospels which record His life and teaching. That impression has also been transmitted by His Church and the spirit of truth and reality which has permeated its noblest members. It is not easy to believe that all this has arisen out of the self-deception of an arch-deceiver. The Christian religion and all that has sprung from it — such as the Christian

Church and the Christian Gospels — has its origin in the self-consciousness of Jesus Himself, and the most fundamental thing in that self-consciousness of Jesus was His sense of oneness with His Heavenly Father. His Heavenly Father was for Him the Great Companion : One who was with Him at all times even when human relations misunderstood Him and human friends and followers deserted Him.

Plotinus, the Christ of neo-Platonism, has defined religion as the 'flight of the Alone to the Alone.' And Professor Whitehead has defined religion as that which 'the individual does with his own solitariness.' As one reads the story of the Gospel these definitions illustrate profoundly the words of St. John's Gospel, 'And yet I am not alone for the Father is with me.'

The essence of the religion of Jesus, the foundation of His claim to be the Messiah, rested upon His sense of communion with God. If the consciousness of that Divine communion was but self-deception, then the religion of Jesus has no foundation at all. If the words *Eloi, Eloi, lama sabachthani* are to be interpreted in this sense — that at the tragic moment of His death Jesus realized what He had never realized before, His self-deception in this matter, the utter unreality of His communion with God—then the secularist derives from this incident formidable proof for his secularist interpretation of the Universe.

But there are two countervailing considerations. Even if we admit that the words *Eloi, Eloi, lama sabachthani* do express our Saviour's sense of desertion by God—the absence of Divine communion — does it prove that because the sense of Divine communion failed Jesus at this moment that therefore all His preceding experience of it was unreal and deceptive? Let us remember that this sense of Divine communion, though far less complete and exalted than in the case of Jesus, is yet a very widespread experience in the history of human religion and possesses a vast amount of testimony of the highest order from the saints and mystics as to its reality. To brush all this aside as of no weight, in view of the secularist interpretation of this Word from the Cross, will not appeal as sound to the judicious mind. Might it not be possible for Jesus at this moment to have experienced the sense of Divine desertion without in the least in-

validating the reality of all His preceding experience of Divine communion with God? Who can say what effect the tragic experience of mortal agony may not have, in some circumstances, on the spirit of man? There is a citation on the title-page of *Ailwyn* by Watts Dunton:

> 'The donkey-driver scratched his head and said to the Cadi: Oh Cadi, who shall say what he will believe or what he will not believe knowing in nowise the mind of Allah, nor his own heart or what it may one day suffer?'

And is it not possible that in such extreme circumstances a man may have the sense that he is deserted by God and that he may be deceived? That though he feels them not, yet underneath there are the everlasting arms? It is quite true that, blessedly for their friends and disciples, many eminent Christians on their death-beds have not experienced, even momentarily, this sense of Divine desertion. Yet John Bunyan, no mean Christian and no mean phychologist, makes the hero of his *Pilgrim's Progress* experience it when crossing the river:

> 'Christian began to sink, and crying out he said, I sink in deep waters; the billows go over my head . . . the sorrows of death have compassed me about; I shall not see the land. . . . And with that a great darkness and horror fell upon Christian, so that he could not see before him. Also here he in great measure lost his senses, so that he could neither remember nor orderly talk of those sweet refreshments that he had met with in the way of his pilgrimage. But all the words that he spake still tended to discover that he had horror of mind and heart. . . . Then said Hopeful, My brother, you have quite forgot the text where it is said of the wicked, "There are no bands in their death."'

'Ah,' you will say, 'these experiences may be explicable, and are explicable, in the case of a man, even a very good man, but surely they are not what we should expect in the case of one who was the Son of God.' Bishop Joseph Butler, a profound theologian, lays down as a principle in his *Analogy* that men are in no sort judges beforehand of the ways of God. Jesus was truly the unique Son of God, but we must not forget that He was also in the fullest sense a Son of Man.

THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY AND ORIGINAL SIN

By the Rev. Principal T. Hywel Hughes, M.A., D.Litt., D.D.

THE doctrine of Original Sin in its form of Original Guilt and Total Depravity owes more to Augustine and the Manichaean strain in his thought than to Scripture or to common-sense, and the Pelagian protest has never been quite laid to rest. In its modified form that protest may be said to have won the victory, for there are undoubted Pelagian elements in the Decrees of the Council of Trent, and even more so in the Roman Catechism which is regarded as of equal authority with the Decrees (see Moxon, *The Doctrine of Sin*, pp. 162-4). In these days few scholars, except the Roman Catholic divines, accept the doctrine in its entirety. It is an interesting fact that the Reformers are more radical in their assertion of Original Guilt and Total Depravity than is the Formula of Trent, and in some senses they are more radical than even Augustine himself, for they push his theories to their extreme logical conclusions. This extreme Augustinian view finds expression in the Augsburg Confession, in Melanchton's Apology, and in the Formula of Concord. Calvin adopted these views, and although Zwingli protested against them, they became the accepted teaching of the Reformed Faith. Moxon sums up their position thus : 'They maintained a depravity so complete and entire that man is only inclined to evil, and they speak in such a way that we are led to conclude that since the Fall the image of God is totally obliterated in man.' The Westminster Confession states this position without modification and it is amplified in the Larger Catechism. There is no doubt that the doctrine as stated in the great documents of the Faith is extremely difficult to accept and justify, and it should be noted that in the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Anglican Church it is very considerably modified. The idea of Total Depravity cannot be substantiated and the conception of Original Guilt is, in the final issue, unethical and cannot be taken seriously in these days. The only form in which it can be held to-day is in the sense of an original bias to wrong in the

nature of man which is handed down through the fact of the solidarity of the race. It is the assertion of a radical antagonism or bent in the nature of man which inclines him to evil, but for which he is not responsible or guilty. Of the position as a whole we may say in the words of Professor H. R. Mackintosh, that 'the traditional idea of total depravity, while no doubt indicative of the fact that no part of our nature is unstained and that we cannot of ourselves do what is in the highest sense good, is nevertheless unscriptural and untrue to life, if we take it to mean that non-Christians are utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good and wholly inclined to all evil' (article 'Sin' in *Ency. of Religion and Ethics*).

There are two points of special interest in view of certain modern psychological theories, and it will be well to state them at the outset. (*a*) In the first place it should be noted that although Augustine, to whom the doctrine is mainly due, argues on the assumption that Adam was created perfect and that the Fall vitiated all his nature — body and soul — it is yet implied that there was a radical weakness in the original nature of Adam before the Fall. Augustine insists again and again that even in his unfallen state Adam could not do God's will without the help of divine grace. There was then some fatal flaw or inherent weakness and incapacity in human nature before the historic fall.

(*b*) This point evidently influenced some of the theologians of the Roman Church, for in the Roman Catechism already mentioned, it is stated that the original holiness and righteousness of Adam were not his by nature but came to him by subsequent endowment. In his original state he was not holy and righteous, and so was not perfect. There was some disparity, not to say antagonism, between his primitive state and that which was his when divine holiness and righteousness had become his possession. The point to note as far as we are at present concerned is the idea of some weakness in the original nature of Adam, with the further suggestion that the result of the fall was a reversion to this disparate, or possibly antagonistic, state of Adam's nature before holiness and righteousness had supervened, *i.e.* a reversion to a more primitive and basal condition. There is no need to stress these points unduly, but they are significant in the light of the positions we are to consider.

I.

It would almost seem as if every man is born either an Augustinian or a Pelagian in this matter, since the two poles of the antinomy represent abiding realities in the situation. Over-emphasis on one side ranges a man on the side of Augustine, whilst excessive stress on the other makes him a Pelagian. The two poles may be regarded as the antithesis between the environmental factor on one side, and the hereditary factor on the other; or again as the emphasis on the will of man in sin on the one hand, and the common stuff of humanity on the other, issuing in a view of sin as an individual fact or as a fact that has a racial and universal bearing. There is no doubt that the more ready acceptance on the part of biologists and scientists in general of the Lamarckian theory of the transmission of acquired mental and moral characteristics makes for the basal truth of the Augustinian position. But on the other hand the application of the theory of evolution to the idea of sin, and the modern emphasis on environment, education, tradition and the social heritage tend in the direction of Pelagianism. If we discard the idea of original guilt, and the extreme form of total depravity as found in Augustine, we find exactly the same cleavage in the two dominant schools of the New Psychology. The Behaviourists are strongly on the side of Pelagius, and if it is permissible to speak of 'Sin' in any sense of the term on their theory, it is always the product of example and teaching, of environment and social heritage. In reality, from the standpoint of the Functional School of Psychology, Sin loses its truly ethical and spiritual character and becomes biological. It is some derangement of function, a mal-adjustment of life, or a failure at adaptation to the environmental forces. Evil is that which hinders the even flow of the forces that make for fuller life, interpreting 'life' in almost all cases from the point of view of physical life. The Behaviourists almost to a man outdo Pelagius in their emphasis on the influence of education, imitation and the environment in the transmssion of evil, and also in their assertion of the non-moral state of each child when he is born, before tradition and the social heritage have done their part in moulding his reactions and shaping his life.

On the other hand the dominant Psycho-analytic School, as represented by Freud, is quite as strongly on the side of Augustine, for Freud finds a radical evil in the very stuff of humanity, in the psychic mass from which each Ego is derived. But it is interesting to note that the same cleavage appears within the Psycho-analytic School, for Jung leans decidedly to the Pelagian side. If we turn for a moment to the theologians, we find that Schleiermacher and Ritschl are mainly on the Pelagian side, for the former works out the idea that the universality of sin is due to acquired habits which have been formed in the course of the ages, whilst the latter seeks to explain the same fact by the influence of education and environment. These factors have produced a complex whole which he calls 'a web of sinful actions and reactions' forming a Kingdom of Sin in opposition to the Kingdom of God. In this view Ritschl foreshadows the theory of Jung, and the same may be said of Pfleiderer and Tennant. On the other hand Julius Muller and Dr. N. P. Williams seem to lean to the Freudian view. We may note also the interesting fact that many of the greatest and profoundest thinkers have pushed back the origin of sin beyond the Fall of Adam, and regarded it as due to a pre-temporal or timeless fall. Among these are Origen, Spinoza, Schelling, Hegel and Kant.

II.

The position of the Behaviourists School on this question is the logical issue of its basal assumptions. All the advocates of what they call 'Functional Psychology' seek to rule out all purely mental facts, and to reduce all behaviour and experience to sensori-motor activity or 'conditioned reflexes' along the line of the reflex arc. There may be some consciousness or awareness connected with such activity, but it has arisen as a by-product and has no causal efficiency whatsoever. As to emotions, instincts, etc., we may regard these in the final issue as purely physiological. Watson was in the earlier days prepared to admit such facts as instincts, desires, etc., but in his last book he has ruled all these out or reduced them to physiological processes. One of his disciples (see Weiss's *A Theoretical Basis for Human Behaviour*) refuses to use the term 'mental' in any connection.

but he proceeds to treat Psychology without assuming any entity except those that are physical; whilst another (Professor W. S. Hunter of Clark University) prefers not to speak of 'psychology' since it implies the existence of psychic facts. So he speaks of 'Anthroponomy,' and says definitely that 'consciousness or experience for the psychologist is merely a name which he applies to what other people call the environment of man.' 'What the psychologist does is to call external and internal environment "mental" and then proceed to study and analyse these environments.' Now from this point of view it is clear that the environmental factors become supreme and the hereditary factor is reduced to a minimum, if not eliminated altogether. So we find Watson insisting that 'any normal child with proper environment and training can be made into any type of man we choose — doctor, lawyer, artist, merchant chief, yes and even beggar man and thief — regardless of his talents, tendencies, abilities, or the vocation and race of his ancestors' (*Behaviourism*, p. 82). Elsewhere he declares that he could take any healthy, well-formed child and make him anything he chose providing he had full control of the child's environment. Woodworth wisely says of this: 'Neither he nor anyone else possesses at present the requisite scientific knowledge for this.' Professor Harrison Elliott of New York takes much the same position as Watson in this matter, for he would eliminate every trace of the hereditary factor and is prepared to defend the position that every child is born in a condition in which there is no bias whatever in the direction of either good or evil. It has no evil dispositions and all its impulses are non-moral, so that it starts from a position of equilibrium or of moral indifference. All its impulses and instinctive urges are biological, and what direction it will take morally in later days depends on the environment and teaching and on these alone. Here is Pelagianism run wild. Dr. J. A. Hadfield (*Psychology and Morals*), although he is not to be classed with this school, seems also to minimize the hereditary factor. Thus he says (p. 8): 'Modern investigation encourages us to believe that few, if any . . . defects of character are inherited. Those who believe in the hereditary view have yet to prove their case.' If we are to understand 'defects of character' literally, this statement may be accepted, for character is

really the result of each individual's own decisions, and as such it cannot be inherited. But dispositions and tendencies may be inherited which tell heavily on a man's character, unless we are to accept the position, as Dr. Hadfield appears to do, that there is no contribution from the past and that almost all, if not quite all, the forces that mould character and determine destiny are derived from the complexes and sentiments that are formed in the early years of childhood. Dr. Hadfield admits that although it is now generally held that tuberculosis is not hereditary, yet something is inheritable, for 'we may inherit a pre-disposition to the disease though we cannot inherit the disease.' Might we not with equal justice say that a child does not inherit sin, and so cannot be regarded as sinful and guilty, but that it might inherit a pre-disposition to certain acts of sin and a tendency towards certain habits that are wrong? We might well believe that these will make it easier for the child to go the way of sin than to walk in the 'paths of righteousness,' and this is really what we mean by 'original sin.' Dr. Hadfield, however, cannot accept this view, for he insists (p. 115) that since 'all impulses are good there is no such thing as evil in itself' . . . 'it is the use of a good impulse at the wrong time, in the wrong place and towards a wrong end.' He calls this 'medical evil.' But if *all impulses are good* there are no such things as pre-dispositions or impulses to evil, and therefore no original sin in the sense of a bias in the nature of man. The vice of all the writers and thinkers who approach the subject from the point of view of pure science and a scientific psychology is that they tend to regard 'good' and 'evil' from the biological standpoint only, as that which subserves or hinders life. This is a criterion that ignores the moral and spiritual values, for there are certain facts which cannot on any theory be said to subserve life in the purely physical and biological sense, but which most assuredly yield ethical fruit and produce higher spiritual values. Dr. Hadfield evidently accepts this biological criterion, for he says (p. 117): 'All the primary impulses must be considered as good' and (p. 141) 'Moral laws are the enunciation of the higher laws of biology.' So does the Behaviourist and the advocate of Functional Psychology outdo Pelagius and deny original sin altogether, making it merely a matter of mal-adjustment to the environmental factors, taking

these as covering all the social heritage into which each individual is born. This position is, in the final issue, contradicted by the persistent intuition of the race, as well as by the deepest experience of the individual.

III.

Among the Psycho-analysts Jung would seem to take very much the same position as the Behaviourists. Both he and Freud ignore the 'Fall Story,' or if they touch on it they regard it as wholly mythical. Neither gives the subject any specific treatment. Jung accepts, as Freud does, the position that there is a radical and inherent cleavage in the nature of man which issues in conflict and is the source of all the 'ills that flesh is heir to.' Moreover, he accepts the view that this is derived from the past history of the race, although he does not seem to think that it was present at the beginning. The human race in the course of its history carries within its consciousness the traces of its past experiences as well as certain acquired habits and tendencies which have become second nature to it. These are the quintessence of past racial experiences, deposits of the ages, fragments of the soul life of the race which have become integrated into habits and dispositions, and as such are handed down to each generation as part of the common human heritage and of the nature which each individual inherits. These remain as strata in each soul, the deepest stratum being the Unconscious. In its general aspect Jung speaks of it as the 'collective unconscious' and each one shares in it. As part of it there is a radical discord, a mal-adaptation due to repeated mal-adjustments and failures in the past, and this issues in unrest and conflict, and from it come evil and sin. Jung does not give us any clear idea of how it began, but he implies that it was not present in the primal life force as a part of primitive human nature. Now although Jung does not connect his theory with a specific or historic 'fall,' his position leaves room for such a fact, and even implies it, for there must have been a first act of mal-adjustment or failure which makes possible the acquired habits of evil and the inherited tendencies to conflict and unrest. Freud on his side emphasizes the disruptive element in human nature much more strongly than Jung, and he regards it as an inherent factor in the

very stuff or plasm from which man's nature is derived. It cannot on his view be due to any one specific act, and any 'fall' that takes place is the result of this element in man's nature and not its cause. To him universal sinfulness is in the very nature of things as far as humanity is concerned. It will be necessary to examine his views carefully, for he has moved away from some of his earlier ideas.

In the early phase of his thought, as represented by his first volumes, he starts with the assumption of a deep and radical antagonism in man's nature between the instincts of self-preservation and of reproduction, an opposition that is in the very nature of these instincts and which finds expression in the different impulses and activities which they prompt. Along the line of this opposition two instinctive groups or complexes develop which yield the distinction between the Ego Instinct and the Sexual Instinct, and the continual conflict and friction between these produce the 'repressions' which are basal to the psychoanalytic position. The Ego Instinct at this stage seems to stand for all the forces in the psychic life of the individual which are opposed to and seek to restrain the Sexual Instinct. At the heart of the reproductive instinct there is a craving or urge towards pleasure of a specific and peculiar kind, and Freud tends to regard this pleasure as the primal and original type of pleasure, and to it he applies the name 'Pleasure Principle.' He seems to regard it as the one differentiation within the lump of humanity, the distinguishing feature of the primal psychic mass, and all other pleasures may be coloured by or derived from this. As present in the mass it is found in animals and in all things that have sensational and perceptual life. Further he suggests that it belongs to a stage in the progress of differentiation within the whole mass when even the specific features of sex and the sex-organs have not yet appeared. Probably if we could get at Freud's own thought on the matter we should find that the root of the conflict between the Ego Instinct and the Sexual Instinct lies in the fact that the Sex Instinct monopolized the Pleasure that belonged to the whole mass — a kind of selfish domination on its part — which leads to its becoming the predominant instinct at the expense of the instinct of self-preservation. As predominant partner the Sex Instinct is at the basis of the theory of

Infantile Sexuality which figures so prominently in the Freudian system, and it appears that it is present before a child is born, for it is in the very stuff of his pre-natal life, and when he is born, it shows itself in the whole matter of his body, skin, muscles, etc., and there are special erogenous zones in his lips and other parts. This is why he finds sexual pleasure in contact with his mother's body, and this accounts also for the Oedipus Complex, as the incestuous wish of the child for his mother, combined with hate of his father.

In the later phase of his thought as represented by *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* and *The Ego and the Id*, Freud departs from his earlier position in several ways. In the conception of the 'Id' he brings us clearer light regarding the original psychic whole or continuum out of which the differentiations which form the Ego Instinct and the Sexual Instinct emerge. The 'Id,' as far as we can understand it, is an undifferentiated mass of plasm of phychic force, and apparently it is unconscious. We cannot, however, regard it as a bare blank, for there must evidently be some urge or tendency within it from the beginning towards the various differentiations that subsequently develop. Further, it would seem that in it the Pleasure Principle holds sway, and this is what gives urge and force to the Sexual Instinct. The Ego is that portion of the psychic mass that has issued in a Psychic Id, and it is dominated by the Sexual Instinct. Further, the Ego is held in restraint by the hard facts of the world, the Reality Principle, as Freud calls it, and this forces the Ego to break away from the Pleasure Principle. This disruptive movement is what brings the cleavage and conflict that lie in the root of man's being. At this point Freud introduces another modification by bringing in the idea of the Ego Ideal, which is a differentiation within the Ego itself. Again he fails to tell us how these differentiations take place, nor where the force for them is found. Probably he regards it as lying in the very nature of the life force which animates the whole mass. By reason of its experience in contact with the Reality Principle the Ego develops certain differentiations within itself along the line of criticism, and this, as it grows, becomes sufficiently strong to restrain the Ego from yielding to the impulses that assail it from the Id. This incipient faculty of criticism grows into reason and mind, but it also brings

into being the Ego Ideal. We can see from this how deep and intense is the cleavage in the nature of man, for now the Ego, in addition to the antagonism of the Sexual Instinct, has to wage battle with two other forces. It has to contend on the one hand with the Reality Principle and on the other with the criticism and judgment of the Ego Ideal. It is little wonder that the individual is rent at the root of his being, for the antagonism arises out of the very stuff from which the Ego grows, and it reveals itself in every phase of his life. In this way the psychic mass is poisoned at its source, and this spreads through all the lump. There is no part that is free from this baneful effect. How like the idea of total depravity! If we ask how this radical antagonism first begins, Freud has little to say to us, but he does suggest that it begins because it lies in the very nature of the ends which the instincts of preservation and sex are meant to serve. The basal purpose of nature is the preservation of the race, and for this reason the Sex Instinct is dominant in man's nature, and in the service of this the individual has to sacrifice himself, nature herself being 'careful of the type' but indifferent to the individual life. This incompatability lies in the very nature of things as far as the processes of life give us any clue. It seems strange for Freud to think of ends which can thus determine the destiny of life, when on his theory of psychological determinism he rules out all idea of purpose from the world.

When we examine the basal assumptions of this position we find that they are open to criticism from several points of view. In the first place we may question the existence of the radical antagonism which Freud assumes between the two basal instincts. A very strong case can be made out for the primacy of the instinct of self-preservation and for holding that all the other instincts, that of sex included, are outgrowths of this and develop in the service of this basal urge of life for security and continuity. If this be so then the antagonism which Freud assumes cannot be in the nature of these instincts. The Sex Instinct, as a differentiation within the instinct of self-preservation, and at its service, must work in harmony with it and subserve its end. The real end of man's life is not mere physical continuity, for the natural processes themselves forbid us to think this, as Lloyd Morgan has shown. The end is the develop-

ment of moral and spiritual life, and there is an urge at the heart of all life towards this goal. The instinct of self-preservation bears within it an urge towards larger life and life of a higher value than mere physical existence, and it is at the bidding of this that the other instincts grow. For this higher life companionship, sympathy, and love are necessary, and so the instinct of reproduction grows, and within this the parental instinct, as a means of producing this higher life. Every other instinct may be regarded as developing in the interests of this supreme end of each individual life.

Then again it is open to question whether there is a radical incompatability, as Freud assumes, between the preservation of the individual and that of the race, and that therefore the ends sought by each instinct are antagonistic. The race can only be continued through the individual, so that the end of each seems to be complementary and harmonious. On the other hand it is being increasingly realized that the individual only attains fulness of being through his service to, and sacrifice for, the race. Man's own contribution to the race is only at its best so long as he keeps the racial end in view as well as his own, and on the other hand the race only comes to its goal as the individuals in it are at their best. So society and the race can only attain their ends through the attainment by the individual of his end. This is the great Christian position, that the individual only comes to completion and realizes himself in the Kingdom of God, and the Kingdom of God is only to be found in those individuals who own the sway of God and do His will.

There is still one more point of criticism. The tendency of all writers of this school is to think of sin as rooted in the instincts and as therefore more or less inevitable, whereas sin, if we are to maintain a conception of it that is moral and spiritual, must be a matter of will, and of man's whole personality. Tansley (*The New Psychology*, chap. 18) definitely says that the great primary instincts cannot help by their very nature antagonizing one another, and it is in this inevitable antagonism that we find the root of the deep discord of human nature which we call Original Sin. It is through this conception of sin as based in the instincts that Freud comes to the conclusion that the nature of the first sin is sexual, and in this Jung agrees, for he says (*Psy-*

chological Types, p. 32) that 'the essence of the pessimistic doctrine of original sin is concupiscence, since it is the untamed Libido that leads men into wrong-doing.' This identification of original sin with concupiscence is interesting inasmuch as there seems to have been a persistent tradition that original sin was connected with matters of sex. This idea is found in Hebrew tradition (*Gen.* vi, 1-4), and there is perhaps a suggestion of it in the Fall story, in the fact that Adam is tempted by the woman. This view became established in the Apocalyptic writings. Some writers, *e.g.* Dr. N. P. Williams, believe that this view influenced Paul and through him came into Christian thought. This is not at all certain, but we know that it did come into Christian thought through the influence of Gregory of Nyssa and Augustine.

It will now be evident how great is the resemblance between the position of the Freudian School and that of the Church's doctrine of original sin, and it is noteworthy that Dr. N. P. Williams in his Bampton Lectures (The Idea of the Fall and Original Sin) accepts their position almost in its entirety. He refuses to accept the psychological determinism of the school as well as the idea that the original sin was sexual. We may say, however, that the psycho-analytic view, in spite of its close resemblance to the doctrine of original sin is yet inferior to it at two essential points. However crude and unacceptable some aspects of the doctrine may be, it does yet lay emphasis on the fact that sin is a matter of man's willing, and is not due to the inevitable urge of his instincts. By so doing it keeps the conception within the realm of moral and spiritual realities. Whilst the instinctive urges may be the stuff or raw material of sin, in its essence it must be regarded as a matter of voluntary choice. Then in the second place, by relating the fact of sin to the psychic mass or the stuff of human nature, the psycho-analysts, in the final issue, throw it back on God, or on the Creator from whom it derives, whereas the Church doctrine relieves God of all responsibility by insisting that it is due to Adam's own choice, although there is a suggestion, as we have seen, of an inherent weakness in the state of Adam before the Fall.

BROAD CHURCHMANSHIP: A STATEMENT OF A POSITION*

'I will shake all nations.'—*Haggai* ii, 7.
'The removing of those things that are shaken that those things which are not shaken may remain.'—*Hebrews* xii, 27.
'Jesus Christ is the same yesterday and to-day and for ever.'—*Hebrews* xiii, 7.

THE second chapter of Haggai is sometimes read on a dedication festival in the hope that Haggai's forecast for the Temple at Jerusalem may apply to our own place of worship, 'The latter glory of this house shall be greater than the former'; but that statement is preceded by another prediction, 'I will shake all nations.' What those words meant to Haggai in 520 B.C. we need not inquire; but centuries afterwards they were taken up by the Christian author of the Epistle to the Hebrews and applied to the fall of Jerusalem and other experiences that befell the Christians of the second generation; but, adds this Christian writer, 'Jesus Christ is the same yesterday, to-day and for ever.' Haggai's prediction as interpreted by the Epistle to the Hebrews seems an appropriate text for the 749th anniversary of the dedication of this church. We have witnessed a 'shaking of the nations'; in this country the shock has been less severe than in some, but we probably feel that our finances and our social structure are insecure, and that its moral and religious basis has been somewhat shaken. In this church there are fewer signs of change than in many churches of the Anglican Communion; we still have a congregation; and worship is still conducted very much as it was some sixty years ago, when the Established Church was represented by such leaders as Archbishop Tait and Dean Stanley, and when the Temple enjoyed the combined ministry of Dr. Vaughan as Master, Mr. Ainger as Reader, and Dr. Hopkins as organist; yet some of us wonder whether this type of Anglican churchmanship has any future.

* Sermon preached by the Rev. J. F. Clayton, M.A., Reader at the Temple Church, at the afternoon service on February 11, 1934, the 749th anniversary of the Dedication of the Round Church.

We must define what we mean by this type of Anglican churchmanship. I speak only for myself, but I think that others in this church may agree with the position that I am going to describe.

1. Christianity needs to be organized; so we need a Church which can give opportunities of teaching, worship, and (if desired) fellowship.

2. We insist on the right of private judgment, which is the fundamental difference between the Reformed and the Unreformed Churches; so we demand a Reformed Church. And, as other people also have the right of private judgment, such a Church must also be comprehensive.

3. While we recognize that private judgment leads many of our fellow-churchmen to the positions indicated by the words Evangelicalism, Anglo-Catholicism, Modernism, we claim the right to stand outside all such groups, while remaining on friendly terms with each of them, and to cultivate a non-party and unenthusiastic type of Anglican Protestantism expressed in the somewhat old-fashioned form of worship that we offer here.

4. We consider that Great Britain is still sufficiently Christian to have established churches expressing a national version of the Christian religion; so we support in England an Established Church which is reformed and Episcopal, and in Scotland an Established Church which is reformed and Presbyterian.

5. We maintain that in England freedom of private judgment and the comprehensiveness of the Reformed Church can best be secured if the final court of appeal is (as at present) the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and not a tribunal of ecclesiastics; so we oppose any attempt to change the present relations of Church and State.

A generation ago this view would have had many supporters, lay and clerical, but to-day doubts are often felt in two directions:

(*a*) Public opinion may become so militarist, so violent, so predatory, so licentious, in a word so 'secularized,' that no Christian Church could decently remain in partnership with such a non-Christian State. Some Churchmen think that this point has already been reached and are therefore consistent in demanding Disestablishment. If, however, you think with me that

responsible public opinion in Great Britain has not yet disowned the ideals of Jesus Christ, then we are logical in supporting both the Reformed Churches established respectively in England and Scotland.

(*b*) The other fear is that in the exercise of their right of private judgment our contemporaries will desire either a type of churchmanship different from our own or, more likely, no church at all. No church is eternal, and religious institutions may in time become obsolete and make way for others; though we probably hope that God will give peace in *our* time so that the Church that we appreciate may last for the rest of our lives. Still there is the feeling that much that we value in our religious organization is being 'shaken.'

Now, even if the Church of England as we understand it ceased to exist, Jesus Christ would still be the same and His work could not be undone. But personally I hope that we shall not be stampeded by panic into any revolutionary changes either in State or Church, and that when the present unsettlement is over the Established Churches of England and Scotland, in closer union than at present, may still be able to supply many of the spiritual needs of a new and perhaps better generation. We can, I think, take courage from the building in which we worship. If one who was present at the dedication service in 1185 could worship here to-day he would probably say that our methods of worship were very strange to him. We should then explain that in the sixteenth century the national Church of England, without breaking with its past, made many changes and accepted many new ideas; yet in this Temple church the same clergyman held the office of Master from 1540 until 1559, that is, through the changes of Edward VI and Mary until the settlement effected by Elizabeth. That settlement was not final, and since 1559 many questions have arisen and many new ideas accepted which were not contemplated in 1559; and in this development an important part has been taken by several Masters of the Temple, from Richard Hooker onwards. With such a past we refuse to despair of the future, and perhaps 'the latter glory of this house may be' even 'greater than the former.'

The type of Anglican Protestantism outlined in this sermon will probably seem too broad to some people, and antiquated to

others; it has its limitations, and its upholders do not expect that it will ever dominate the religion of this country; yet the Law and the History of the Church of England, especially as represented in this Temple church, warrant us in saying, if we so wish, that such a type of Christian thought, conduct, and worship has a rightful place in 'the Reformed Branch of Christ's Holy Catholic Church established in this Kingdom.'

BOOK REVIEWS

THE FOUR WITNESSES*

The fascinating field of synoptic criticism has of late attracted many who are not professional New Testament scholars, and it may be that those whose main interests lie in other directions are best fitted 'to acquaint the general reader with the main results of the work of scholars.' Here the Headmaster of Alleyns's School, Dulwich, endeavours to 'give to the public an account of the present position of scholarship in regard to the first three Gospels.' Indeed, he does more. Before he comes to grips with his subject he writes 'Acknowledgments,' 'An Apology,' a 'Preface,' a 'Prologue,' a 'Note,' an 'Introduction,' not to mention a chapter on the 'Background to the New Testament.' Towards the end of the book there are chapters on 'Old Testament Prophesy,' 'Eschatology,' 'Miracles,' and 'The Atonement,' which are of somewhat doubtful relevance to the author's theme.

The Four Witnesses are the documents believed to have been used by the synoptic writers in the composition of their gospels, *viz.* Q, common to Matthew and Luke; Mark; M, which is Matthew's peculiar material; and L, which is Luke's special source. Mr. Henderson is most interested in Q, which he considers to be the earliest of the four ('perhaps about 40 A.D.'), and to which he attaches great importance.

The author is not afraid to attempt the formidable task of reconstructing the text of Q, dividing the material into twelve 'chapters' rounded off with a final saying, 'Wheresoever the carcase is, there will the eagles be gathered together.' 'It cannot of course be proved that these were the last words of the original Q. The most that can be said is that they *may* have been and that they form a most fitting closing scene. The eagles may be taken to signify the leaders — Priests, Pharisees, Scribes, Lawyers — left to pick what they can find off the carcase of Judaism.' The author then prints the text of M and of L with a few brief notes, but since there is no reproduction of the Marcan text, the passages without their framework appear merely as disjointed fragments, unlikely to interest the general reader.

The chief question which arises from a perusal of the book is whether the author is justified in drawing the conclusions he does as to the nature of Q. All we really know is that Matthew and Luke used some common material besides the Gospel of Mark, and that this second common source consisted for the most part of teaching, although it seems to have contained also an account of the ministry of John the Baptist, of the Temptation, and perhaps a few other incidents. Whether Q stands for one source

* *The Four Witnesses.* By R. B. Henderson, M.A. (Heinemann, Ltd. 1933. 7/6.)

or several, whether it was wholly written or partly oral, and whether it included many passages which now appear only in Matthew or only in Luke, is not known and will probably never be known. That being so, to write of 'the Gospel according to Q' and to attempt any accurate determination of its distinctive characteristics is a somewhat hazardous proceeding. Harnack made the attempt to reconstruct the text of Q, but his reconstruction had not commanded universal assent, and of late years the complexity of the problem has been increasingly recognized. Quite recently Professor Burkitt wrote: 'We do not know much about Q. We cannot recover those parts of it which neither Matthew nor Luke saw fit to insert into their own works. Still less can we know for certain what it did *not* contain. It remains for us a collection of fragments.' [1]

But it is not a collection of fragments for Mr. Henderson. He sorts out the verses which he ascribes to Q, and does his best to reconstruct Q's 'Gospel.' It is useful to have the fragments arranged in some sort of order and separated from Marcan and other material; but the reader must realize not only that the order is due to Mr. Henderson, but also that the actual wording of the passages is often chosen arbitrarily. Matthew and Luke sometimes differ so widely in their rendering of 'common' passages that it is more than possible they were using different sources, and even in passages where the correspondence is closer it is dangerous work to print a text which claims to be the original Q. Mr. Henderson's principle is that the 'better Greek' is sure not to be the original, but it is doubtful whether in practice that rule will carry us far. Many of the differences between Matthew and Luke are not merely a matter of linguistic elegance. In the book before us the principle is not applied in detail. Indeed, many students of the Gospels will feel that an attempt of this kind is hardly worth making except on the basis of the Greek text. Critical work cannot be done in translation. It is a pity that the few Greek words which appear in the text are not more carefully printed. In thirteen words on p. 43 there are four irregularities of breathing and accent, and there are others in different parts of the book.

Apart from the difficulty of reconstructing Q, it may be doubted whether Mr. Henderson is justified in attaching quite so much importance to this source. He writes: 'It is difficult to see how any claim for it can be too great.' 'Q is no mere collection of sayings, but a treatise written with a definite purpose and intelligible plan.' 'The book may be reconstructed with sufficient accuracy to leave little room for question as to its main outlines.' Hence its witness is always to be preferred. Surely this is to go beyond the evidence, and when Mr. Henderson proceeds to compare Q with the Fourth Gospel, the cautious reader will feel that he is being led into the realm of fancy. The argument appears to rest on Mt. xi, 28-30, 'Come unto me all ye that labour . . ,' with which is compared Jn. xx, 31, to show that both works had a definitely spiritual purpose. But the Matthean passage is not found in Luke at all, and it is a pure assumption that it belonged to Q. 'Without this addition not only is this Agalliasis passage deprived of its meaning and its logical conclusion, but the entire work of Q, if it is to be regarded as in any sense a connected thesis and not a mere collection of disjointed sayings, falls to the ground.' So Mr. Henderson adds these words because his conception of Q requires them, and then argues from their inclusion as to the character of Q!

Again, we read on p. 193 that 'the resemblances between Q and the Gospel of St. John go deep. The relation between the two works is so

[1] *Jesus Christ, An Historical Outline* (p. 73).

close that it is hard to think of them as being entirely independent.' That is indeed a novel thesis and it should have been defended. It is difficult to imagine how anyone possessed of a feeling for style, not to say a comprehension of theology, could have written, 'it is tempting to suppose that John wrote Q as a young man, and the gospel when he was very old.' Even Mr. Henderson admits that 'there are many objections to an otherwise attractive theory.'

As one reads on it becomes clear what is the source of some of the author's critical judgments. Mr. Henderson is no lover of miracles, and Q contains none; he is no believer in sacerdotalism, and the simple moral teaching of Q seems to stand at the opposite pole to institutional religion; therefore Q must be nearer to the original than Mark, which is full of miracles and other ideas not acceptable to the modern mind. It is a dangerous method of criticism.

There is much in this book that is of value, particularly those parts which are derived from the teaching of the late Professor Kennett; but as to its main intention we fear that the general reader will not gain from it a very clear or a very accurate idea of the present position of New Testament criticism. Whatever we may think of the theories of the 'form-critics' we can hardly afford to ignore them, as Mr. Henderson does, and if we pay any attention to them we cannot assume that the records of the teaching of Jesus are so much more trustworthy than the records of His doings. The claims of Mark to our respect are hardly less than those of Q. All we can be sure of is that when Matthew and Luke took in hand to write their gospels, probably between 80 and 95 A.D., they made use of Mark's gospel and of certain other materials, some of which they had in common. The common material we may call Q if we like, but its date, contents, authorship, and general characteristics are quite uncertain, and although patient research has not been without result, the answer to our problems is not to be reached by the easy guesswork of Mr. Henderson.

P. GARDNER-SMITH.

THE HOPE OF THE WORLD*

This volume contains sermons which were first delivered in church and later broadcasted. Dr. Fosdick gives no dates, but we would hazard the guess that all of them are of fairly recent composition. The name of Mr. Walter Lippmann appears more than once, and it may not be entirely fanciful to suppose that Dr. Fosdick had in mind some of Mr. Lippmann's criticisms in 'A Preface to Morals.' Mr. Lippmann, in discussing the effect of the doctrine of religious tradition on art, says: 'No painter who ever lived could make a picture which expressed the religion of the Rev. Harry Emerson Fosdick. There is nothing there which the visual imagination can see.' 'At its best,' Mr. Lippmann continues, 'it (*i.e.* modern religious writing) has the qualities of an impassioned argument and more often it is intolerably flat and vague, because in our intellectual climate scepticism dissolves the correctness of the imagery and leaves behind sonorous adjectives and opaque nouns.'

Let it be said at once that Dr. Fosdick's sermons certainly have 'the qualities of an impassioned argument.' They have this in their written form, and we may imagine that their force was still greater when they were spoken. Moreover they possess something else. They abound in really good illustrations. Anyone acquainted with Dr. Fosdick's books will not be sur-

* *The Hope of the World.* By H. E. Fosdick. (S.C.M. 1933. 6/-.)

prised at this. At the same time, illustration is not the same thing as imagery, and it would seem that the reader of this latest book must endorse Mr. Lippmann's criticism that 'no painter who ever lived could make a picture which expressed' Dr. Fosdick's religion. Whether or not such a criticism really detracts from the value of the Liberalism which Dr. Fosdick represents, is another question. It may well be that the religion of the future will find other media for its expression than the kind of imagery, both pictorial and verbal, with which it has been associated in the past. The point really is, does Dr. Fosdick, or does he not, express for the modern man the thoughts, feelings and aspirations which the modern man recognizes as religious for him? (They may or may not be religious in a narrow orthodox sense, but that is neither here nor there.) The answer is that to a large extent Dr. Fosdick does. It is perfectly true that when Dr. Fosdick speaks positively his language becomes vague. It cannot really be otherwise. Liberals, and Modernists, are always accused of being vague. Let it be so. We know what the other people, who make the accusation, really want, and we know we do not want *that*. We do not want to go the way of Rome or Tennessee, of Hitler or Buchman. Imagery abounds in Nazi circles; the whole Roman idea is built up on it. We know we do not want any of it. Modernists must continue to accept 'the discipline of incompleteness,' and in certain matters incompleteness means vagueness. But vagueness does not mean vacuity. The quotation which follows, taken from the last page of the book, is vague through and through. Who would dare to call it empty of real meaning?

> 'The invisible is real. Say it to yourselves. Let it be a rallying cry to your souls when days are difficult and endurance hard, when death befalls your fireside or, like a "dark mother always gliding near with soft feet," comes to your own doorstep. The invisible is real. Let it challenge your conscience, also, when carnal things loom too vivid and spiritual values seem too dim. The invisible is real. Let it usher you now into life eternal, so that when the great change comes it may be for you, whose real life has long been in the unseen, like going home. For this is the root of all great religion, this is the meaning of all faith in God, this is the basis of immortal hope, this is the radiance of the Easter morning—that we endure as seeing Him who is—aye, and those who are—invisible.'

How much vaguer than the concrete picture of an empty tomb! But how much more inspiring!

Roy McKay.

A MODERN CHRISTIAN PLATONIST*

Dr. Whitehead's new book is plainly important, even for those who do not specialize in philosophy. Of its four sections one, labelled 'philosophical,' is not for the layman, and develops some of the points of *Process and Reality*. The others are for any reader, prepared to puzzle out occasional passages in technical language. In return, the pages are shot with illuminating and often witty *dicta* on a very wide range of topics, reminding one of Dean Inge's *Outspoken Essays*. The general impression is of profound searching wisdom, and of an attitude which is buoyant, optimistic, and forward-looking.

To the Modern Churchman in particular the book will be of the greatest interest and stimulus. More than one-third of it is concerned with religion

**Adventures of Ideas.* By A. N. Whitehead. (Cambridge University Press. 1933. 12/6.)

and theology. To the modernist clergy Dr. Whitehead at one point makes a direct appeal. He would himself not disclaim the label of 'Christian Platonist,' though his position is often not 'orthodox,' and his 'platonism' is a new and original contribution to thought. There is stimulating power and help in this book, but dogmatic finality is expressly anathematized. The general subject is an analysis of civilization and of its development. Of the importance of religion for this investigation, Dr. Whitehead is fully conscious.

In the first part the development of the ideas of freedom, humanity (humaneness) and tolerance is the main theme. The debt of the world to the original and adventurous mind of Greece is emphasized together with its debt to the Christian Church. The whole tone is rousingly modernistic. 'Adventure' is the watchword for success in life, spiritual as well as physical. No static civilization is possible.

Of most immediate concern to modernists is the chapter headed 'The New Reformation,' in which he appeals for a new, modernist theology. In religion, simple solutions are bogus solutions. Reason is essential, and in the formulating of a body of doctrine the services of the Greek Fathers to religion no less than to metaphysics are rated by Dr. Whitehead very highly. Hence the liberal clergy and laymen of the nineteenth century who attacked systematic theology were profoundly misguided (p. 207). Yet finality of dogma is a mistaken end and the Church gains by including a variety of analogous types of doctrinal formulations which can and do influence one another (p. 220). We should rejoice, not despair, that there is no final, authoritative doctrine. Dr. Whitehead has no patience with the emotionalists who deny the competence of reason—the school which claims many Catholic conversions. This anti-intellectualism comes from assuming (p. 287), often tacitly, that intellect must proceed according to certain methods, and so often deducing that it is intrinsically tied to erroneous fictions. But rationalism is not tied to 'science' as these reason-hating apologists would wish. The fundamental mistake is to suppose that no information is obtainable except from the five senses (p. 289). Reason is only beginning to enter into its heritage.

Dr. Whitehead recognizing, as most modernists do, inspiration in a wider range than the scriptural canon, makes the suggestion of a new Bible (p. 219) 'omitting barbarisms such as the Revelation' and including 'the imaginative account given by Thucydides of the speech of Pericles,' and similar things. But he is no mere innovator. He insists that radical theologians 'should to-day concentrate upon . . . historical origins,' for 'as far as such an appeal to tradition can be made with complete honesty . . . there is an enormous gain in popular effectiveness.' 'If you want to make a *new start* in religion, you must be content to wait a thousand years' (p. 220). Christianity is the supreme religion by its appeal to the life of Christ as a revelation of the nature of God and of His agency in the world. 'Its power lies in its revelation in act, of that which Plato first divined in theory,' namely, of 'persuasion' in creation, of the perpetually working Divine Love or Eros. The task of theology is 'to show how the world is founded on something beyond mere transient fact and issues in something beyond the perishing of occasions: how life includes a satisfaction deeper than joy or sorrow.' The great metaphysical achievement of the Greek Fathers and the Schoolmen comprised the doctrines of immanent and transcendent law, and explained the relationship of the world to God better than did Plato. But, and this is Dr. Whitehead's peculiarity, a doctrine of mutual immanence is involved. It is the doctrine of Grace which has been neglected

by later theology, and it is here that Dr. Whitehead looks for advance in modern theory.

In his last section, on the supreme 'Values,' Dr. Whitehead is most provocative. He definitely declares that 'Beauty is a wider, more fundamental notion than Truth.' . . . 'The teleology of the universe is directed to the production of Beauty . . . a truth relation may be evil' (p. 342). 'Beauty is the one aim which . . . is self-justifying,' though 'truthful beauty is the highest of all.' This solves the conflict between art and morality in a strange way, or so it will seem to many. And it opens the door to a type of irrationalist apologetic only too popular — the assertion that beauty of ritual and emotional effectiveness are to be preferred to truthfulness.

I conclude this review with some random examples of the *dicta* which adorn this book.

'The defect of the liberal theology of the last two hundred years is that it has confined itself to the suggestion of minor, vapid reasons why people should continue to go to church in the traditional fashion.'

'The Hebrew prophets constitute one of the few groups of men who decisively altered history.'

'A certain excessiveness seems a necessary element in all greatness.'

'The doctrines which best repay critical examination are those which for the longest period have remained unquestioned.'

'One great contribution of the mediaeval Church was the accidental discovery of "corporate" freedom apart from the State.'

'Intolerance, the will to power, is intellectual barbarism.'

C. G. Rich.

THE WORD OF THE CROSS TO HINDUS*

The very title of this book is symptomatic of the revolution which is taking place in missionary methods: the day seems to be passing when the Gospel is preached to the Brahmin intelligentsia (who often know the Bible better than does the average Christian) in the same language as to an European slum. The work of Max Müller, Deussen, Von Glasenapp, Otto Hauer, and our own Farquhar, has shown us how much the great religious mine of India can yield to the patient seeker, and we are at last beginning to wake up to the fact that Hinduism has in its vast treasure house, besides much dross, a sterling core of inestimable value to those who can discern it. And yet we are only beginning . . . . Old prejudices die hard, and there is a great need of more research and diffusion of knowledge in this absorbing and vitally important field.

It is a matter for regret that many writers still ignore the relation of Christianity to the other great religions, and almost any work in this sphere deserves a welcome. Mr. Thompson has mastered some of the Sanskrit religious literature and ritual, and brings to it a warm conviction as to the message of Jesus: but even though he can quote Tagore with as much approval as his own John Wesley, it must unfortunately be doubted whether (in the eyes of the Indian readers for whom 'this book is in part intended') he has always succeeded in his aim of 'avoiding that irritating method, as unscientific as it is ungenerous, which selects the worst in one religion and contrasts it with the best in another.' He seems on many pages to take the extreme Monism of the Advaita Vedanta as typical of all Indian thought, forgetting the personal theism of Ramanuja and the Bhakti of the Vaishnavas: nor is it wholly fair to the Advaita system to say that the transla-

* *The Word of the Cross to Hindus*. By E. W. Thompson. (Epworth Press, 1933. 7/6.)

tion of 'Maya' as 'Illusion' 'appears to be as exact a rendering as one can find in the English Language' (p. 6). Ramanuja even uses it for 'intelligence' (p. 145 note), which is hardly reconcileable with 'Illusion.' Why not 'Appearance,' as F. H. Bradley used it? For to Sankara himself (if not to his more superficial followers) the Personal God experienced in the world of Maya has a very definite, though limited, reality.

Again, in speaking of Karma, our author seeks to pin it down to its most naïve presentation. Has he any right to dismiss a modern interpretation by the Central Hindu College at Benares (probably influenced by Christianity) as 'belonging more to theosophy than to orthodox Hinduism'? (p. 178). Surely it is this up-to-date and representative form of the doctrine which the modern missionary should study and perhaps even use as an ally to save the world from the colourless and amoral materialism which threatens to destroy its life.

Most of the book is devoted to an exposition of the writer's own faith, and with these pages, except for a certain diffuseness and lack of clear cohesion, we can have no quarrel. But there is but little trace of a *specific* interpretation for Hindus: that would demand a far more radical and searching analysis than is here presented. It is hard to see how Hindus are to be converted if *all* their traditions are so *fundamentally* different and inferior as our author makes out. And yet there are clear signs that India itself is beginning to see the greatness of her need for the Gospel. It is surely the task of scholars to give it in a form which she can make her own: a task still scarcely begun.

H. P. KINGDON.

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE INQUISITION

The history of the Inquisition from the time of its rise under Pope Innocent III is of such singular importance for the understanding of that type of religious psychology which would make the heretic a far worse offender than the immoral that Sir Alexander Cardew has, by his book,* performed a singular service. The works of such authors as Lea and Verrill are of such bulk that this short condensation will be the more acceptable to the average reader. The author sketches the history of the Inquisition, illustrating this history by a study of its methods and penalties, and finally points out that the Roman Church has abated little of its mediaeval ferocity. Unfortunately, a lack of sympathy leads him to speak with coldness (pp. 13 ff.) of the Thirteenth Century, which in spite of the fact that it saw the rise of the Inquisition, was a century of European greatness, whilst this same lack of sympathy causes him to seek to stamp the Christianity of the Patristic Age as intolerant and makes his attack definitely unfair. He instances the persecution of Priscillianism in Spain but fails to point out that this persecution caused strong protests from both Ambrose and Martin of Tours. Tolerance is quite a modern growth: the Roman Empire was intolerant in the Third Century, the church after Constantine was intolerant, the Mediaeval Church was intolerant, the Reformers were intolerant. The point is that whereas Protestantism has apologised fully for the intolerance of its forbears, the Roman Church refuses to move in any way from the standpoint of Innocent III. To all who wish to understand why many still fear the political activities of the Roman Church, we recommend Sir Alexander Cardew's entertaining little volume.

F. H. A. MICKLEWRIGHT.

* *A Short History of the Inquisition.* By Sir Alexander G. Cardew, K.C.S.I., M.A. (Watts & Co., 1933. 3/-.)

CORRESPONDENCE

LITURGICAL EXPERIMENT.

SIR,

From time to time you touch on the need of liturgical reform and experiment, if the admitted decline of public worship is to be arrested. The complete story is only known to the incumbents of our parish churches. Occasionally a report appears in the Press of especially large congregations, whenever an incumbent has sought to meet human needs by organising a special service in addition to the familar offices of the Book of Common Prayer.

Has not the moment arrived for clergy, who are already making such experiments, to pool their ideas, and try to plan 'A Christian Year' equal to modern conditions?

A number of special services at judicious intervals throughout the Church Year would do much to arrest the attention and interest of many, who simply cannot be brought to see at present the value of the ordinary Sunday services.

As a rule some seven special services are held in this church each year: a Carol and Christmas Tree service, British Legion Parade, the Hallowing of Passion Sunday, special observance of the anniversary of the Consecration of the Church, Doctors' Sunday, Sportsmen's Service, a ritual presentation of the Parable of the Prodigal Son, and a special Remembrance Sunday Service at Armistice-tide. There is obviously a wide field for experiment—our homes, the cause of world peace, the relations of art and literature to religion come to mind.

Doubtless the Prayer Book adequately covered the needs of another age. Can we meet the needs of to-day as effectively?

A. T. WOODMAN DOWDING.

Christ Church Vicarage,
Crouch End, N.8.

DISINTERESTED SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH.

SIR,

If you will allow me, I should like to say a word or two in reply to Mr. Payne. I did not mean to suggest that science was riddled with graft, or that men of science, as individuals, were not disinterested. All I suggest is that scientific research is directed into channels dictated by finance. As scientific research is an extremely expensive business, this is, I suppose, under present circumstances, inevitable. In *The Listener* for 3rd January, 1934, there is printed part of a discussion between Professor H. Levy and Professor Julian Huxley which dealt with this very point. Asked about funds available for research (which he put at between four and six million), and how these were utilised, Professor Huxley is reported as having said:

> 'At the top of the list comes research directed to industrial needs—that is counting the money spent by Government, by University departments of applied science and by private firms—with, I should say, nearly half the total. Research for the fighting services, not counting mere development, takes about half what is spent on industry. Research on agriculture and related subjects comes next with a fifth or a sixth of the total, and research connected with medicine and health with an eighth or even less. And research in all other branches, together with all pure background research, probably does not come to a twelfth.'

The point is that scientific research is organised and planned to a disproportionate extent for industrial purposes, and not predominantly or directly for human welfare. As Professor Levy sardonically remarked, 'The fact is that if industry really needed a healthy population we should have one.' I suggest to Mr. Payne that if science were genuinely disinterested, and not bound up like the rest of us in the cash nexus, we should get more extensive and more serious researches on such important matters as diet, noise, contraceptives, human heredity, child nurture, and so on. At present research in these spheres does not pay, and Imperial Chemical Industries can buy up scientific talent and turn it on to researches which in the next war will be found more useful for destroying human life than for preserving it. Professor Huxley in the discussion above-mentioned observed, 'There are actually more trained research workers in chemistry in a single one of the several research laboratories of I.C.I. than there are trained research workers in psychology in the entire country!'

But psychology, according to Mr. Payne, who is a chemist, is not a science; it is only a pseudo-science as yet. But before Dalton I suppose even chemistry was not yet an exact science. Psychology, however, if it has not yet become an exact science, is fast becoming so. And it would become so far faster if the results of psychological inquiry were found to pay sufficiently for industry to devote large sums to further it. As a matter of fact the Industrial Health (formerly Fatigue) Research Board of the Medical Research Council has carried out investigations of value to the fighting services. Psychological tests were developed for use at the Royal Dockyard and also for Royal Air Force apprentices, with special reference to accident causation. Useful work is also being done on devising means to measure the aptitudes of juveniles for various forms of employment. Psychology, it will be noted, is no more disinterested than any other science. It has to go, like the rest, where money calls it.

With regard to sociology, Mr. Payne may be excused for writhing at the condition of this science. But that is not the fault of the science itself, but is due to the fewness of the workers who can devote themselves to it, and also to the extreme complexity of its subject-matter. The situation at present is that the simplest sciences have the greatest number of devotees. Psychology and sociology are starved, because the study of them does not pay. Yet they are the sciences of the future—if there is going to be any future; which the chemists have rendered extremely doubtful.

Partington Vicarage, Manchester. J. C. HARDWICK.
February 24th, 1934.

A LAY VIEW OF FASTING.

SIR,

It has occurred to me, after reading in your February issue the very interesting article about fasting, with much of which I entirely agree, that possibly there is something more to say.

When I meditate on the words of Our Lord, 'When ye fast . . . appear not unto men to fast, but unto thy Father which is in secret: and thy Father, which seeth in secret, shall reward thee openly,' I am led to believe that the very profound and original thinker who uttered those words was perhaps doing more than giving a hint on method to those practising a discipline to which He was, if not a stranger, practically indifferent. The voice sounds like an authentic voice, of one speaking out of his own deep

experience: how else could He have known, I do not say the inefficacy of paraded fasting, but the grace bestowed by the Father which seeth in secret? Most certainly He was not an unthinking follower of custom: then He drew that saying out of the deep well of His own living water, and betrayed for a moment what fasting meant to Him.

Suppose then that He thought of it not as a way of escape, but as a voluntary partaking of the sum of sorrow; a deliberate choosing not to have all that is within the grasp, not so much in order to acquire strength of will, as for very shame and grief at the evil and sorrow that are in the world; not with the idea of pleasing God, but with the humble, timid hope of trying to share His appalling load: is there something here which the very sensible veiw of your writer has possibly overlooked? If man could come within measurable hope of sharing the thoughts of the Son of Man, would there not be a real, recognisable value (an 'open' reward) in trying to offer, for one's own sins and for the sins and sorrows of the whole world, a secret discipline, not only in food but in the use of leisure and of books and of money, in short, of all opportunities and all possessions? Such discipline would have to be, like His, life-long; like His, unguessed at; a going softly in secret, while trying to cheer one's fellows in the daily round.

'Such knowledge is too wonderful and excellent for me: I cannot attain unto it.' But dimly and very far off one might seem to see that *if* fasting could be so understood and so practised, the Father which seeth in secret would reward it openly: for there would grow up in the spirit the realisation of an undeniable new power, to bear things with God, to *want* to bear them—a power which would issue in the outward grace of joy.

F. L. GHEY.

St. Mary's Hall,
Kemp Town, Brighton.
March 6th, 1934.

THE PLAINT OF A PREPOSTEROUS PADRE.

SIR,

I am, in a measure, an outsider. For nineteen years I have been out of England in places where you sometimes have to carry a six-shooter on each hip and one down each leg of your trousers. I have lived in a country where you touch life elemental, where you are close to the issues of life and death, and where you get beneath the artificial strata of modern civilisation. And on my return to the homeland this is how the Church of England strikes me.

Firstly it seems to me that the Church of England has become an organised trades union. It has divided into the Anglo-Catholic party, the Modernist party, and the Modern-Evangelical party: and each of these three parties is a highly organised section. I have been told by my clerical friends that if I want to get on in the Church, I must belong to one of these parties — wear their label and sail under their banner. Ye gods and little fishes!

Secondly, I cannot help feeling that our Church is rather like a long iron cylinder through which souls are turned into a mould. The children are carefully shepherded in Sunday School, carefully steered through Confirmation, and carefully guided into the conventional activities of Church life. The Church has become a factory. Yes, yes, it's all very well — but such a process produces only a standard model, and completely militates against the liberation of the individuality.

Thirdly, I feel that the Church does not touch the man in the street. It doesn't. It attaches to itself various young men of the Scout or similar movements, but it has completely lost its hold on the average man. Where is the C.E.M.S. of twenty years ago? Where are the men's classes that used to flourish? Do you know a single church where there is a large men's meeting? With me the test of the virility of the Church always has been: *does it touch the men?*

And yet the man in the street is intensely religious. He has an ever-growing attachment to the Man of Nazareth. I knock about with him, and I know. I knock about with the man in the street at the football field, the running track, the boxing ring, the dance hall, and the Turf. I go to these places because I like to go there, and because I consider them part of life. I go in a dog-collar. Man after man has come to me and told me how fed up he was with the Church. And man after man has come to me to ask me about real religion. I travelled back on the boat from India with a tough cove whom we called Texas Jack. Sort of cove who whips out a couple of six-shooters, and who knows all about poker. Lousy with money, he was. Had so much he didn't know how to spend it. Hailed from Texas. One day he called from the bar:

'Come and have a drink,' he invited.

'Don't feel like it now,' I said. 'Later on.'

'Y' know,' he said, 'I like you no end. First parson I've ever liked. Hate the rest. I've watched you on board here. You're human. You shake a leg in a dance, and have your quiet drink, and play cards, and are real cheerful. I've taken to you no end.'

'For those few nuts——' I began, feeling uncomfortable.

'I'd like to talk to you,' he said. 'Will you come to my cabin?'

'Sure,' said I, being occasionally addicted to American slang.

I went to his cabin. And for one hour, with his hands gripped in earnestness and tears streaming down his rugged face, he asked me to show him how to find Jesus Christ.

* * * * *

What is wrong with the Church of England? To me it is the greatest Church in the world. But what is wrong with it? Why does it mis-fire? Why is it only sparking on three?

The reason I give is this. The Church has neither realised nor preached that humanity is divine. I am an orthodox Christian. By that I mean that after much study and thought I am a convinced believer in the Virgin Birth, the Resurrection, and the Uniqueness of Jesus Christ. But I also have found that man has Divinity within him, and that that was part of the central message of the Man of Nazareth. If our Church is to go on to growing life, it must awake to this Truth of Being. It must learn to love life. Until then it will fail to touch that decent and religious fella, the man in the street.

STANLEY MCKELVIE.

Oscott Grange, Erdington, Birmingham.
January 24th, 1934.

CORRIGENDUM.

We regret that on p. 631 (February issue) we described the Rev. Dr. Archibald Fleming as an English Presbyterian; his right designation is Church of Scotland.—ED., *M.C.*